linux/include/linux/capability.h
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   1/*
   2 * This is <linux/capability.h>
   3 *
   4 * Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
   5 * Alexander Kjeldaas <astor@guardian.no>
   6 * with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main.
   7 *
   8 * See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance):
   9 *
  10 * ftp://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/
  11 */
  12#ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
  13#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
  14
  15#include <uapi/linux/capability.h>
  16
  17
  18#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
  19#define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S    _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3
  20
  21extern int file_caps_enabled;
  22
  23typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
  24        __u32 cap[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
  25} kernel_cap_t;
  26
  27/* exact same as vfs_cap_data but in cpu endian and always filled completely */
  28struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
  29        __u32 magic_etc;
  30        kernel_cap_t permitted;
  31        kernel_cap_t inheritable;
  32};
  33
  34#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE  (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
  35#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE     (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
  36
  37
  38struct file;
  39struct inode;
  40struct dentry;
  41struct user_namespace;
  42
  43struct user_namespace *current_user_ns(void);
  44
  45extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
  46extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
  47
  48/*
  49 * Internal kernel functions only
  50 */
  51
  52#define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi)  \
  53        for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi)
  54
  55/*
  56 * CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS:
  57 *
  58 * The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant.
  59 * At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE.
  60 *
  61 * It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs.
  62 *
  63 * We could also define fsmask as follows:
  64 *   1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions
  65 *   2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions
  66 */
  67
  68# define CAP_FS_MASK_B0     (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN)             \
  69                            | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD)            \
  70                            | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)     \
  71                            | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)  \
  72                            | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER)           \
  73                            | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FSETID))
  74
  75# define CAP_FS_MASK_B1     (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
  76
  77#if _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2
  78# error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers
  79#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */
  80
  81#define CAP_LAST_U32                    ((_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S) - 1)
  82#define CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK         (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LAST_CAP + 1) -1)
  83
  84# define CAP_EMPTY_SET    ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
  85# define CAP_FULL_SET     ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK }})
  86# define CAP_FS_SET       ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
  87                                    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \
  88                                    CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
  89# define CAP_NFSD_SET     ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
  90                                    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \
  91                                    CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
  92
  93#endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
  94
  95# define cap_clear(c)         do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0)
  96
  97#define cap_raise(c, flag)  ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
  98#define cap_lower(c, flag)  ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
  99#define cap_raised(c, flag) ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
 100
 101#define CAP_BOP_ALL(c, a, b, OP)                                    \
 102do {                                                                \
 103        unsigned __capi;                                            \
 104        CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {                                  \
 105                c.cap[__capi] = a.cap[__capi] OP b.cap[__capi];     \
 106        }                                                           \
 107} while (0)
 108
 109#define CAP_UOP_ALL(c, a, OP)                                       \
 110do {                                                                \
 111        unsigned __capi;                                            \
 112        CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {                                  \
 113                c.cap[__capi] = OP a.cap[__capi];                   \
 114        }                                                           \
 115} while (0)
 116
 117static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(const kernel_cap_t a,
 118                                       const kernel_cap_t b)
 119{
 120        kernel_cap_t dest;
 121        CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, |);
 122        return dest;
 123}
 124
 125static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(const kernel_cap_t a,
 126                                         const kernel_cap_t b)
 127{
 128        kernel_cap_t dest;
 129        CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, b, &);
 130        return dest;
 131}
 132
 133static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(const kernel_cap_t a,
 134                                    const kernel_cap_t drop)
 135{
 136        kernel_cap_t dest;
 137        CAP_BOP_ALL(dest, a, drop, &~);
 138        return dest;
 139}
 140
 141static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c)
 142{
 143        kernel_cap_t dest;
 144        CAP_UOP_ALL(dest, c, ~);
 145        return dest;
 146}
 147
 148static inline int cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
 149{
 150        unsigned __capi;
 151        CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
 152                if (a.cap[__capi] != 0)
 153                        return 0;
 154        }
 155        return 1;
 156}
 157
 158/*
 159 * Check if "a" is a subset of "set".
 160 * return 1 if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set"
 161 *      cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return 1
 162 * return 0 if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set"
 163 *      cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return 0
 164 */
 165static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
 166{
 167        kernel_cap_t dest;
 168        dest = cap_drop(a, set);
 169        return cap_isclear(dest);
 170}
 171
 172/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
 173
 174static inline int cap_is_fs_cap(int cap)
 175{
 176        const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
 177        return !!(CAP_TO_MASK(cap) & __cap_fs_set.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)]);
 178}
 179
 180static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
 181{
 182        const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
 183        return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
 184}
 185
 186static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
 187                                            const kernel_cap_t permitted)
 188{
 189        const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
 190        return cap_combine(a,
 191                           cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_fs_set));
 192}
 193
 194static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
 195{
 196        const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
 197        return cap_drop(a, __cap_fs_set);
 198}
 199
 200static inline kernel_cap_t cap_raise_nfsd_set(const kernel_cap_t a,
 201                                              const kernel_cap_t permitted)
 202{
 203        const kernel_cap_t __cap_nfsd_set = CAP_NFSD_SET;
 204        return cap_combine(a,
 205                           cap_intersect(permitted, __cap_nfsd_set));
 206}
 207
 208#ifdef CONFIG_MULTIUSER
 209extern bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
 210extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
 211                              struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 212extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
 213extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
 214                                      struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 215extern bool capable(int cap);
 216extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 217#else
 218static inline bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
 219{
 220        return true;
 221}
 222static inline bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
 223                              struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
 224{
 225        return true;
 226}
 227static inline bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
 228{
 229        return true;
 230}
 231static inline bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
 232                                      struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
 233{
 234        return true;
 235}
 236static inline bool capable(int cap)
 237{
 238        return true;
 239}
 240static inline bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
 241{
 242        return true;
 243}
 244#endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */
 245extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
 246extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
 247
 248/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
 249extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
 250
 251#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
 252