#include <linux/extable.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/sched/debug.h>
#include <xen/xen.h>

#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/kdebug.h>

typedef bool (*ex_handler_t)(const struct exception_table_entry *,
                            struct pt_regs *, int);

static inline unsigned long
ex_fixup_addr(const struct exception_table_entry *x)
{
        return (unsigned long)&x->fixup + x->fixup;
}
static inline ex_handler_t
ex_fixup_handler(const struct exception_table_entry *x)
{
        return (ex_handler_t)((unsigned long)&x->handler + x->handler);
}

__visible bool ex_handler_default(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
                                  struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
        regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
        return true;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_default);

__visible bool ex_handler_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
                                struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
        regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
        regs->ax = trapnr;
        return true;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ex_handler_fault);

/*
 * Handler for UD0 exception following a failed test against the
 * result of a refcount inc/dec/add/sub.
 */
__visible bool ex_handler_refcount(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
                                   struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
        /* First unconditionally saturate the refcount. */
        *(int *)regs->cx = INT_MIN / 2;

        /*
         * Strictly speaking, this reports the fixup destination, not
         * the fault location, and not the actually overflowing
         * instruction, which is the instruction before the "js", but
         * since that instruction could be a variety of lengths, just
         * report the location after the overflow, which should be close
         * enough for finding the overflow, as it's at least back in
         * the function, having returned from .text.unlikely.
         */
        regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);

        /*
         * This function has been called because either a negative refcount
         * value was seen by any of the refcount functions, or a zero
         * refcount value was seen by refcount_dec().
         *
         * If we crossed from INT_MAX to INT_MIN, OF (Overflow Flag: result
         * wrapped around) will be set. Additionally, seeing the refcount
         * reach 0 will set ZF (Zero Flag: result was zero). In each of
         * these cases we want a report, since it's a boundary condition.
         * The SF case is not reported since it indicates post-boundary
         * manipulations below zero or above INT_MAX. And if none of the
         * flags are set, something has gone very wrong, so report it.
         */
        if (regs->flags & (X86_EFLAGS_OF | X86_EFLAGS_ZF)) {
                bool zero = regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_ZF;

                refcount_error_report(regs, zero ? "hit zero" : "overflow");
        } else if ((regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_SF) == 0) {
                /* Report if none of OF, ZF, nor SF are set. */
                refcount_error_report(regs, "unexpected saturation");
        }

        return true;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_refcount);

/*
 * Handler for when we fail to restore a task's FPU state.  We should never get
 * here because the FPU state of a task using the FPU (task->thread.fpu.state)
 * should always be valid.  However, past bugs have allowed userspace to set
 * reserved bits in the XSAVE area using PTRACE_SETREGSET or sys_rt_sigreturn().
 * These caused XRSTOR to fail when switching to the task, leaking the FPU
 * registers of the task previously executing on the CPU.  Mitigate this class
 * of vulnerability by restoring from the initial state (essentially, zeroing
 * out all the FPU registers) if we can't restore from the task's FPU state.
 */
__visible bool ex_handler_fprestore(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
                                    struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
        regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);

        WARN_ONCE(1, "Bad FPU state detected at %pB, reinitializing FPU registers.",
                  (void *)instruction_pointer(regs));

        __copy_kernel_to_fpregs(&init_fpstate, -1);
        return true;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ex_handler_fprestore);

__visible bool ex_handler_ext(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
                              struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
        /* Special hack for uaccess_err */
        current->thread.uaccess_err = 1;
        regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
        return true;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_ext);

__visible bool ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
                                       struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
        if (pr_warn_once("unchecked MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x%x at rIP: 0x%lx (%pF)\n",
                         (unsigned int)regs->cx, regs->ip, (void *)regs->ip))
                show_stack_regs(regs);

        /* Pretend that the read succeeded and returned 0. */
        regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
        regs->ax = 0;
        regs->dx = 0;
        return true;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe);

__visible bool ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
                                       struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
        if (pr_warn_once("unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x%x (tried to write 0x%08x%08x) at rIP: 0x%lx (%pF)\n",
                         (unsigned int)regs->cx, (unsigned int)regs->dx,
                         (unsigned int)regs->ax,  regs->ip, (void *)regs->ip))
                show_stack_regs(regs);

        /* Pretend that the write succeeded. */
        regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
        return true;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe);

__visible bool ex_handler_clear_fs(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
                                   struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
        if (static_cpu_has(X86_BUG_NULL_SEG))
                asm volatile ("mov %0, %%fs" : : "rm" (__USER_DS));
        asm volatile ("mov %0, %%fs" : : "rm" (0));
        return ex_handler_default(fixup, regs, trapnr);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_clear_fs);

__visible bool ex_has_fault_handler(unsigned long ip)
{
        const struct exception_table_entry *e;
        ex_handler_t handler;

        e = search_exception_tables(ip);
        if (!e)
                return false;
        handler = ex_fixup_handler(e);

        return handler == ex_handler_fault;
}

int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
        const struct exception_table_entry *e;
        ex_handler_t handler;

#ifdef CONFIG_PNPBIOS
        if (unlikely(SEGMENT_IS_PNP_CODE(regs->cs))) {
                extern u32 pnp_bios_fault_eip, pnp_bios_fault_esp;
                extern u32 pnp_bios_is_utter_crap;
                pnp_bios_is_utter_crap = 1;
                printk(KERN_CRIT "PNPBIOS fault.. attempting recovery.\n");
                __asm__ volatile(
                        "movl %0, %%esp\n\t"
                        "jmp *%1\n\t"
                        : : "g" (pnp_bios_fault_esp), "g" (pnp_bios_fault_eip));
                panic("do_trap: can't hit this");
        }
#endif

        e = search_exception_tables(regs->ip);
        if (!e)
                return 0;

        handler = ex_fixup_handler(e);
        return handler(e, regs, trapnr);
}

extern unsigned int early_recursion_flag;

/* Restricted version used during very early boot */
void __init early_fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
        /* Ignore early NMIs. */
        if (trapnr == X86_TRAP_NMI)
                return;

        if (early_recursion_flag > 2)
                goto halt_loop;

        /*
         * Old CPUs leave the high bits of CS on the stack
         * undefined.  I'm not sure which CPUs do this, but at least
         * the 486 DX works this way.
         * Xen pv domains are not using the default __KERNEL_CS.
         */
        if (!xen_pv_domain() && regs->cs != __KERNEL_CS)
                goto fail;

        /*
         * The full exception fixup machinery is available as soon as
         * the early IDT is loaded.  This means that it is the
         * responsibility of extable users to either function correctly
         * when handlers are invoked early or to simply avoid causing
         * exceptions before they're ready to handle them.
         *
         * This is better than filtering which handlers can be used,
         * because refusing to call a handler here is guaranteed to
         * result in a hard-to-debug panic.
         *
         * Keep in mind that not all vectors actually get here.  Early
         * fage faults, for example, are special.
         */
        if (fixup_exception(regs, trapnr))
                return;

        if (fixup_bug(regs, trapnr))
                return;

fail:
        early_printk("PANIC: early exception 0x%02x IP %lx:%lx error %lx cr2 0x%lx\n",
                     (unsigned)trapnr, (unsigned long)regs->cs, regs->ip,
                     regs->orig_ax, read_cr2());

        show_regs(regs);

halt_loop:
        while (true)
                halt();
}