linux/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
<<
>>
Prefs
   1/*
   2 *  Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
   3 *
   4 *  This file contains the smack hook function implementations.
   5 *
   6 *  Authors:
   7 *      Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
   8 *      Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
   9 *
  10 *  Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
  11 *  Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
  12 *                Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
  13 *  Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation
  14 *  Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation.
  15 *
  16 *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  17 *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
  18 *      as published by the Free Software Foundation.
  19 */
  20
  21#include <linux/xattr.h>
  22#include <linux/pagemap.h>
  23#include <linux/mount.h>
  24#include <linux/stat.h>
  25#include <linux/kd.h>
  26#include <asm/ioctls.h>
  27#include <linux/ip.h>
  28#include <linux/tcp.h>
  29#include <linux/udp.h>
  30#include <linux/dccp.h>
  31#include <linux/slab.h>
  32#include <linux/mutex.h>
  33#include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
  34#include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
  35#include <net/ip.h>
  36#include <net/ipv6.h>
  37#include <linux/audit.h>
  38#include <linux/magic.h>
  39#include <linux/dcache.h>
  40#include <linux/personality.h>
  41#include <linux/msg.h>
  42#include <linux/shm.h>
  43#include <linux/binfmts.h>
  44#include <linux/parser.h>
  45#include "smack.h"
  46
  47#define TRANS_TRUE      "TRUE"
  48#define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4
  49
  50#define SMK_CONNECTING  0
  51#define SMK_RECEIVING   1
  52#define SMK_SENDING     2
  53
  54#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
  55static LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
  56#endif
  57static struct kmem_cache *smack_inode_cache;
  58int smack_enabled;
  59
  60static const match_table_t smk_mount_tokens = {
  61        {Opt_fsdefault, SMK_FSDEFAULT "%s"},
  62        {Opt_fsfloor, SMK_FSFLOOR "%s"},
  63        {Opt_fshat, SMK_FSHAT "%s"},
  64        {Opt_fsroot, SMK_FSROOT "%s"},
  65        {Opt_fstransmute, SMK_FSTRANS "%s"},
  66        {Opt_error, NULL},
  67};
  68
  69#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
  70static char *smk_bu_mess[] = {
  71        "Bringup Error",        /* Unused */
  72        "Bringup",              /* SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW */
  73        "Unconfined Subject",   /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT */
  74        "Unconfined Object",    /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT */
  75};
  76
  77static void smk_bu_mode(int mode, char *s)
  78{
  79        int i = 0;
  80
  81        if (mode & MAY_READ)
  82                s[i++] = 'r';
  83        if (mode & MAY_WRITE)
  84                s[i++] = 'w';
  85        if (mode & MAY_EXEC)
  86                s[i++] = 'x';
  87        if (mode & MAY_APPEND)
  88                s[i++] = 'a';
  89        if (mode & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
  90                s[i++] = 't';
  91        if (mode & MAY_LOCK)
  92                s[i++] = 'l';
  93        if (i == 0)
  94                s[i++] = '-';
  95        s[i] = '\0';
  96}
  97#endif
  98
  99#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
 100static int smk_bu_note(char *note, struct smack_known *sskp,
 101                       struct smack_known *oskp, int mode, int rc)
 102{
 103        char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
 104
 105        if (rc <= 0)
 106                return rc;
 107        if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
 108                rc = 0;
 109
 110        smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
 111        pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
 112                sskp->smk_known, oskp->smk_known, acc, note);
 113        return 0;
 114}
 115#else
 116#define smk_bu_note(note, sskp, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
 117#endif
 118
 119#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
 120static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp,
 121                          int mode, int rc)
 122{
 123        struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
 124        char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
 125
 126        if (rc <= 0)
 127                return rc;
 128        if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
 129                rc = 0;
 130
 131        smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
 132        pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
 133                tsp->smk_task->smk_known, oskp->smk_known,
 134                acc, current->comm, note);
 135        return 0;
 136}
 137#else
 138#define smk_bu_current(note, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
 139#endif
 140
 141#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
 142static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
 143{
 144        struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
 145        struct smack_known *smk_task = smk_of_task_struct(otp);
 146        char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
 147
 148        if (rc <= 0)
 149                return rc;
 150        if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
 151                rc = 0;
 152
 153        smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
 154        pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s to %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
 155                tsp->smk_task->smk_known, smk_task->smk_known, acc,
 156                current->comm, otp->comm);
 157        return 0;
 158}
 159#else
 160#define smk_bu_task(otp, mode, RC) (RC)
 161#endif
 162
 163#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
 164static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc)
 165{
 166        struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
 167        struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
 168        char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
 169
 170        if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
 171                pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
 172                        inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
 173
 174        if (rc <= 0)
 175                return rc;
 176        if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
 177                rc = 0;
 178        if (rc == SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT &&
 179            (mode & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)))
 180                isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_IMPURE;
 181
 182        smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
 183
 184        pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) inode=(%s %ld) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
 185                tsp->smk_task->smk_known, isp->smk_inode->smk_known, acc,
 186                inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
 187        return 0;
 188}
 189#else
 190#define smk_bu_inode(inode, mode, RC) (RC)
 191#endif
 192
 193#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
 194static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
 195{
 196        struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
 197        struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
 198        struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 199        struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
 200        char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
 201
 202        if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
 203                pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
 204                        inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
 205
 206        if (rc <= 0)
 207                return rc;
 208        if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
 209                rc = 0;
 210
 211        smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
 212        pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
 213                sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
 214                inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
 215                current->comm);
 216        return 0;
 217}
 218#else
 219#define smk_bu_file(file, mode, RC) (RC)
 220#endif
 221
 222#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
 223static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
 224                                int mode, int rc)
 225{
 226        struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
 227        struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
 228        struct inode *inode = file->f_inode;
 229        struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
 230        char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
 231
 232        if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
 233                pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
 234                        inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
 235
 236        if (rc <= 0)
 237                return rc;
 238        if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
 239                rc = 0;
 240
 241        smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
 242        pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
 243                sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
 244                inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
 245                current->comm);
 246        return 0;
 247}
 248#else
 249#define smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, mode, RC) (RC)
 250#endif
 251
 252/**
 253 * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
 254 * @name: type of the label (attribute)
 255 * @ip: a pointer to the inode
 256 * @dp: a pointer to the dentry
 257 *
 258 * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label,
 259 * NULL if there was no label to fetch, or an error code.
 260 */
 261static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
 262                                        struct dentry *dp)
 263{
 264        int rc;
 265        char *buffer;
 266        struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
 267
 268        if (!(ip->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
 269                return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
 270
 271        buffer = kzalloc(SMK_LONGLABEL, GFP_KERNEL);
 272        if (buffer == NULL)
 273                return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 274
 275        rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, ip, name, buffer, SMK_LONGLABEL);
 276        if (rc < 0)
 277                skp = ERR_PTR(rc);
 278        else if (rc == 0)
 279                skp = NULL;
 280        else
 281                skp = smk_import_entry(buffer, rc);
 282
 283        kfree(buffer);
 284
 285        return skp;
 286}
 287
 288/**
 289 * new_inode_smack - allocate an inode security blob
 290 * @skp: a pointer to the Smack label entry to use in the blob
 291 *
 292 * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
 293 */
 294static struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp)
 295{
 296        struct inode_smack *isp;
 297
 298        isp = kmem_cache_zalloc(smack_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
 299        if (isp == NULL)
 300                return NULL;
 301
 302        isp->smk_inode = skp;
 303        isp->smk_flags = 0;
 304        mutex_init(&isp->smk_lock);
 305
 306        return isp;
 307}
 308
 309/**
 310 * new_task_smack - allocate a task security blob
 311 * @task: a pointer to the Smack label for the running task
 312 * @forked: a pointer to the Smack label for the forked task
 313 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
 314 *
 315 * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
 316 */
 317static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(struct smack_known *task,
 318                                        struct smack_known *forked, gfp_t gfp)
 319{
 320        struct task_smack *tsp;
 321
 322        tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
 323        if (tsp == NULL)
 324                return NULL;
 325
 326        tsp->smk_task = task;
 327        tsp->smk_forked = forked;
 328        INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
 329        INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_relabel);
 330        mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
 331
 332        return tsp;
 333}
 334
 335/**
 336 * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set
 337 * @nhead: new rules header pointer
 338 * @ohead: old rules header pointer
 339 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
 340 *
 341 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
 342 */
 343static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
 344                                gfp_t gfp)
 345{
 346        struct smack_rule *nrp;
 347        struct smack_rule *orp;
 348        int rc = 0;
 349
 350        INIT_LIST_HEAD(nhead);
 351
 352        list_for_each_entry_rcu(orp, ohead, list) {
 353                nrp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_rule), gfp);
 354                if (nrp == NULL) {
 355                        rc = -ENOMEM;
 356                        break;
 357                }
 358                *nrp = *orp;
 359                list_add_rcu(&nrp->list, nhead);
 360        }
 361        return rc;
 362}
 363
 364/**
 365 * smk_copy_relabel - copy smk_relabel labels list
 366 * @nhead: new rules header pointer
 367 * @ohead: old rules header pointer
 368 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
 369 *
 370 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
 371 */
 372static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
 373                                gfp_t gfp)
 374{
 375        struct smack_known_list_elem *nklep;
 376        struct smack_known_list_elem *oklep;
 377
 378        INIT_LIST_HEAD(nhead);
 379
 380        list_for_each_entry(oklep, ohead, list) {
 381                nklep = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_known_list_elem), gfp);
 382                if (nklep == NULL) {
 383                        smk_destroy_label_list(nhead);
 384                        return -ENOMEM;
 385                }
 386                nklep->smk_label = oklep->smk_label;
 387                list_add(&nklep->list, nhead);
 388        }
 389
 390        return 0;
 391}
 392
 393/**
 394 * smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_*
 395 * @mode - input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_*
 396 *
 397 * Returns a converted MAY_* mode usable by smack rules
 398 */
 399static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
 400{
 401        if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)
 402                return MAY_READWRITE;
 403        if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
 404                return MAY_READ;
 405
 406        return 0;
 407}
 408
 409/**
 410 * smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access
 411 * @tracer: tracer process
 412 * @tracee_known: label entry of the process that's about to be traced
 413 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
 414 * @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit
 415 *
 416 * Returns 0 on access granted, -error on error
 417 */
 418static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
 419                                 struct smack_known *tracee_known,
 420                                 unsigned int mode, const char *func)
 421{
 422        int rc;
 423        struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL;
 424        struct task_smack *tsp;
 425        struct smack_known *tracer_known;
 426
 427        if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
 428                smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
 429                smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer);
 430                saip = &ad;
 431        }
 432
 433        rcu_read_lock();
 434        tsp = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
 435        tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp);
 436
 437        if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
 438            (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT ||
 439             smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)) {
 440                if (tracer_known->smk_known == tracee_known->smk_known)
 441                        rc = 0;
 442                else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
 443                        rc = -EACCES;
 444                else if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
 445                        rc = 0;
 446                else
 447                        rc = -EACCES;
 448
 449                if (saip)
 450                        smack_log(tracer_known->smk_known,
 451                                  tracee_known->smk_known,
 452                                  0, rc, saip);
 453
 454                rcu_read_unlock();
 455                return rc;
 456        }
 457
 458        /* In case of rule==SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT or mode==PTRACE_MODE_READ */
 459        rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_known, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
 460
 461        rcu_read_unlock();
 462        return rc;
 463}
 464
 465/*
 466 * LSM hooks.
 467 * We he, that is fun!
 468 */
 469
 470/**
 471 * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
 472 * @ctp: child task pointer
 473 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
 474 *
 475 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
 476 *
 477 * Do the capability checks.
 478 */
 479static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
 480{
 481        struct smack_known *skp;
 482
 483        skp = smk_of_task_struct(ctp);
 484
 485        return smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__);
 486}
 487
 488/**
 489 * smack_ptrace_traceme - Smack approval on PTRACE_TRACEME
 490 * @ptp: parent task pointer
 491 *
 492 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
 493 *
 494 * Do the capability checks, and require PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH.
 495 */
 496static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
 497{
 498        int rc;
 499        struct smack_known *skp;
 500
 501        skp = smk_of_task(current_security());
 502
 503        rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
 504        return rc;
 505}
 506
 507/**
 508 * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog
 509 * @type: message type
 510 *
 511 * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise.
 512 */
 513static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
 514{
 515        int rc = 0;
 516        struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
 517
 518        if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
 519                return 0;
 520
 521        if (smack_syslog_label != NULL && smack_syslog_label != skp)
 522                rc = -EACCES;
 523
 524        return rc;
 525}
 526
 527
 528/*
 529 * Superblock Hooks.
 530 */
 531
 532/**
 533 * smack_sb_alloc_security - allocate a superblock blob
 534 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
 535 *
 536 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
 537 */
 538static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
 539{
 540        struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
 541
 542        sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
 543
 544        if (sbsp == NULL)
 545                return -ENOMEM;
 546
 547        sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor;
 548        sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
 549        sbsp->smk_floor = &smack_known_floor;
 550        sbsp->smk_hat = &smack_known_hat;
 551        /*
 552         * SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc.
 553         */
 554        sb->s_security = sbsp;
 555
 556        return 0;
 557}
 558
 559/**
 560 * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob
 561 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
 562 *
 563 */
 564static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
 565{
 566        kfree(sb->s_security);
 567        sb->s_security = NULL;
 568}
 569
 570/**
 571 * smack_sb_copy_data - copy mount options data for processing
 572 * @orig: where to start
 573 * @smackopts: mount options string
 574 *
 575 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
 576 *
 577 * Copy the Smack specific mount options out of the mount
 578 * options list.
 579 */
 580static int smack_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *smackopts)
 581{
 582        char *cp, *commap, *otheropts, *dp;
 583
 584        otheropts = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
 585        if (otheropts == NULL)
 586                return -ENOMEM;
 587
 588        for (cp = orig, commap = orig; commap != NULL; cp = commap + 1) {
 589                if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSDEFAULT) == cp)
 590                        dp = smackopts;
 591                else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSFLOOR) == cp)
 592                        dp = smackopts;
 593                else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSHAT) == cp)
 594                        dp = smackopts;
 595                else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSROOT) == cp)
 596                        dp = smackopts;
 597                else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSTRANS) == cp)
 598                        dp = smackopts;
 599                else
 600                        dp = otheropts;
 601
 602                commap = strchr(cp, ',');
 603                if (commap != NULL)
 604                        *commap = '\0';
 605
 606                if (*dp != '\0')
 607                        strcat(dp, ",");
 608                strcat(dp, cp);
 609        }
 610
 611        strcpy(orig, otheropts);
 612        free_page((unsigned long)otheropts);
 613
 614        return 0;
 615}
 616
 617/**
 618 * smack_parse_opts_str - parse Smack specific mount options
 619 * @options: mount options string
 620 * @opts: where to store converted mount opts
 621 *
 622 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
 623 *
 624 * converts Smack specific mount options to generic security option format
 625 */
 626static int smack_parse_opts_str(char *options,
 627                struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 628{
 629        char *p;
 630        char *fsdefault = NULL;
 631        char *fsfloor = NULL;
 632        char *fshat = NULL;
 633        char *fsroot = NULL;
 634        char *fstransmute = NULL;
 635        int rc = -ENOMEM;
 636        int num_mnt_opts = 0;
 637        int token;
 638
 639        opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
 640
 641        if (!options)
 642                return 0;
 643
 644        while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
 645                substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
 646
 647                if (!*p)
 648                        continue;
 649
 650                token = match_token(p, smk_mount_tokens, args);
 651
 652                switch (token) {
 653                case Opt_fsdefault:
 654                        if (fsdefault)
 655                                goto out_opt_err;
 656                        fsdefault = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 657                        if (!fsdefault)
 658                                goto out_err;
 659                        break;
 660                case Opt_fsfloor:
 661                        if (fsfloor)
 662                                goto out_opt_err;
 663                        fsfloor = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 664                        if (!fsfloor)
 665                                goto out_err;
 666                        break;
 667                case Opt_fshat:
 668                        if (fshat)
 669                                goto out_opt_err;
 670                        fshat = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 671                        if (!fshat)
 672                                goto out_err;
 673                        break;
 674                case Opt_fsroot:
 675                        if (fsroot)
 676                                goto out_opt_err;
 677                        fsroot = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 678                        if (!fsroot)
 679                                goto out_err;
 680                        break;
 681                case Opt_fstransmute:
 682                        if (fstransmute)
 683                                goto out_opt_err;
 684                        fstransmute = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 685                        if (!fstransmute)
 686                                goto out_err;
 687                        break;
 688                default:
 689                        rc = -EINVAL;
 690                        pr_warn("Smack:  unknown mount option\n");
 691                        goto out_err;
 692                }
 693        }
 694
 695        opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
 696        if (!opts->mnt_opts)
 697                goto out_err;
 698
 699        opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int),
 700                        GFP_ATOMIC);
 701        if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
 702                kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
 703                goto out_err;
 704        }
 705
 706        if (fsdefault) {
 707                opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsdefault;
 708                opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSDEFAULT_MNT;
 709        }
 710        if (fsfloor) {
 711                opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsfloor;
 712                opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSFLOOR_MNT;
 713        }
 714        if (fshat) {
 715                opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fshat;
 716                opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSHAT_MNT;
 717        }
 718        if (fsroot) {
 719                opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsroot;
 720                opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSROOT_MNT;
 721        }
 722        if (fstransmute) {
 723                opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fstransmute;
 724                opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSTRANS_MNT;
 725        }
 726
 727        opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
 728        return 0;
 729
 730out_opt_err:
 731        rc = -EINVAL;
 732        pr_warn("Smack: duplicate mount options\n");
 733
 734out_err:
 735        kfree(fsdefault);
 736        kfree(fsfloor);
 737        kfree(fshat);
 738        kfree(fsroot);
 739        kfree(fstransmute);
 740        return rc;
 741}
 742
 743/**
 744 * smack_set_mnt_opts - set Smack specific mount options
 745 * @sb: the file system superblock
 746 * @opts: Smack mount options
 747 * @kern_flags: mount option from kernel space or user space
 748 * @set_kern_flags: where to store converted mount opts
 749 *
 750 * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
 751 *
 752 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set Smack mount
 753 * labels.
 754 */
 755static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 756                struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
 757                unsigned long kern_flags,
 758                unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
 759{
 760        struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
 761        struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
 762        struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
 763        struct inode_smack *isp;
 764        struct smack_known *skp;
 765        int i;
 766        int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
 767        int transmute = 0;
 768
 769        if (sp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_INITIALIZED)
 770                return 0;
 771
 772        sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_INITIALIZED;
 773
 774        for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
 775                switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
 776                case FSDEFAULT_MNT:
 777                        skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
 778                        if (IS_ERR(skp))
 779                                return PTR_ERR(skp);
 780                        sp->smk_default = skp;
 781                        break;
 782                case FSFLOOR_MNT:
 783                        skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
 784                        if (IS_ERR(skp))
 785                                return PTR_ERR(skp);
 786                        sp->smk_floor = skp;
 787                        break;
 788                case FSHAT_MNT:
 789                        skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
 790                        if (IS_ERR(skp))
 791                                return PTR_ERR(skp);
 792                        sp->smk_hat = skp;
 793                        break;
 794                case FSROOT_MNT:
 795                        skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
 796                        if (IS_ERR(skp))
 797                                return PTR_ERR(skp);
 798                        sp->smk_root = skp;
 799                        break;
 800                case FSTRANS_MNT:
 801                        skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
 802                        if (IS_ERR(skp))
 803                                return PTR_ERR(skp);
 804                        sp->smk_root = skp;
 805                        transmute = 1;
 806                        break;
 807                default:
 808                        break;
 809                }
 810        }
 811
 812        if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
 813                /*
 814                 * Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values.
 815                 */
 816                if (num_opts)
 817                        return -EPERM;
 818                /*
 819                 * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller.
 820                 */
 821                skp = smk_of_current();
 822                sp->smk_root = skp;
 823                sp->smk_default = skp;
 824                /*
 825                 * For a handful of fs types with no user-controlled
 826                 * backing store it's okay to trust security labels
 827                 * in the filesystem. The rest are untrusted.
 828                 */
 829                if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
 830                    sb->s_magic != SYSFS_MAGIC && sb->s_magic != TMPFS_MAGIC &&
 831                    sb->s_magic != RAMFS_MAGIC) {
 832                        transmute = 1;
 833                        sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED;
 834                }
 835        }
 836
 837        /*
 838         * Initialize the root inode.
 839         */
 840        isp = inode->i_security;
 841        if (isp == NULL) {
 842                isp = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
 843                if (isp == NULL)
 844                        return -ENOMEM;
 845                inode->i_security = isp;
 846        } else
 847                isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root;
 848
 849        if (transmute)
 850                isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
 851
 852        return 0;
 853}
 854
 855/**
 856 * smack_sb_kern_mount - Smack specific mount processing
 857 * @sb: the file system superblock
 858 * @flags: the mount flags
 859 * @data: the smack mount options
 860 *
 861 * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
 862 */
 863static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 864{
 865        int rc = 0;
 866        char *options = data;
 867        struct security_mnt_opts opts;
 868
 869        security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
 870
 871        if (!options)
 872                goto out;
 873
 874        rc = smack_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
 875        if (rc)
 876                goto out_err;
 877
 878out:
 879        rc = smack_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
 880
 881out_err:
 882        security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
 883        return rc;
 884}
 885
 886/**
 887 * smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
 888 * @dentry: identifies the file system in question
 889 *
 890 * Returns 0 if current can read the floor of the filesystem,
 891 * and error code otherwise
 892 */
 893static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 894{
 895        struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
 896        int rc;
 897        struct smk_audit_info ad;
 898
 899        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
 900        smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 901
 902        rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
 903        rc = smk_bu_current("statfs", sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, rc);
 904        return rc;
 905}
 906
 907/*
 908 * BPRM hooks
 909 */
 910
 911/**
 912 * smack_bprm_set_creds - set creds for exec
 913 * @bprm: the exec information
 914 *
 915 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -EPERM if exec forbidden and -ENOMEM otherwise
 916 */
 917static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 918{
 919        struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
 920        struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
 921        struct inode_smack *isp;
 922        struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
 923        int rc;
 924
 925        if (bprm->cred_prepared)
 926                return 0;
 927
 928        isp = inode->i_security;
 929        if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
 930                return 0;
 931
 932        sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
 933        if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) &&
 934            isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
 935                return 0;
 936
 937        if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
 938                struct task_struct *tracer;
 939                rc = 0;
 940
 941                rcu_read_lock();
 942                tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
 943                if (likely(tracer != NULL))
 944                        rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(tracer,
 945                                                   isp->smk_task,
 946                                                   PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH,
 947                                                   __func__);
 948                rcu_read_unlock();
 949
 950                if (rc != 0)
 951                        return rc;
 952        } else if (bprm->unsafe)
 953                return -EPERM;
 954
 955        bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
 956        bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
 957
 958        return 0;
 959}
 960
 961/**
 962 * smack_bprm_committing_creds - Prepare to install the new credentials
 963 * from bprm.
 964 *
 965 * @bprm: binprm for exec
 966 */
 967static void smack_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 968{
 969        struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
 970
 971        if (bsp->smk_task != bsp->smk_forked)
 972                current->pdeath_signal = 0;
 973}
 974
 975/**
 976 * smack_bprm_secureexec - Return the decision to use secureexec.
 977 * @bprm: binprm for exec
 978 *
 979 * Returns 0 on success.
 980 */
 981static int smack_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 982{
 983        struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
 984
 985        if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_forked)
 986                return 1;
 987
 988        return 0;
 989}
 990
 991/*
 992 * Inode hooks
 993 */
 994
 995/**
 996 * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob
 997 * @inode: the inode in need of a blob
 998 *
 999 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
1000 */
1001static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
1002{
1003        struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
1004
1005        inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(skp);
1006        if (inode->i_security == NULL)
1007                return -ENOMEM;
1008        return 0;
1009}
1010
1011/**
1012 * smack_inode_free_security - free an inode blob
1013 * @inode: the inode with a blob
1014 *
1015 * Clears the blob pointer in inode
1016 */
1017static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
1018{
1019        kmem_cache_free(smack_inode_cache, inode->i_security);
1020        inode->i_security = NULL;
1021}
1022
1023/**
1024 * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
1025 * @inode: the newly created inode
1026 * @dir: containing directory object
1027 * @qstr: unused
1028 * @name: where to put the attribute name
1029 * @value: where to put the attribute value
1030 * @len: where to put the length of the attribute
1031 *
1032 * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
1033 */
1034static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
1035                                     const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
1036                                     void **value, size_t *len)
1037{
1038        struct inode_smack *issp = inode->i_security;
1039        struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
1040        struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1041        struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
1042        int may;
1043
1044        if (name)
1045                *name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX;
1046
1047        if (value && len) {
1048                rcu_read_lock();
1049                may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
1050                                       &skp->smk_rules);
1051                rcu_read_unlock();
1052
1053                /*
1054                 * If the access rule allows transmutation and
1055                 * the directory requests transmutation then
1056                 * by all means transmute.
1057                 * Mark the inode as changed.
1058                 */
1059                if (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
1060                    smk_inode_transmutable(dir)) {
1061                        isp = dsp;
1062                        issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
1063                }
1064
1065                *value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
1066                if (*value == NULL)
1067                        return -ENOMEM;
1068
1069                *len = strlen(isp->smk_known);
1070        }
1071
1072        return 0;
1073}
1074
1075/**
1076 * smack_inode_link - Smack check on link
1077 * @old_dentry: the existing object
1078 * @dir: unused
1079 * @new_dentry: the new object
1080 *
1081 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1082 */
1083static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
1084                            struct dentry *new_dentry)
1085{
1086        struct smack_known *isp;
1087        struct smk_audit_info ad;
1088        int rc;
1089
1090        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1091        smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1092
1093        isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1094        rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1095        rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1096
1097        if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1098                isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1099                smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1100                rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1101                rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1102        }
1103
1104        return rc;
1105}
1106
1107/**
1108 * smack_inode_unlink - Smack check on inode deletion
1109 * @dir: containing directory object
1110 * @dentry: file to unlink
1111 *
1112 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1113 * and the object, error code otherwise
1114 */
1115static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1116{
1117        struct inode *ip = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1118        struct smk_audit_info ad;
1119        int rc;
1120
1121        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1122        smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1123
1124        /*
1125         * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
1126         */
1127        rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1128        rc = smk_bu_inode(ip, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1129        if (rc == 0) {
1130                /*
1131                 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1132                 */
1133                smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1134                smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1135                rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1136                rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1137        }
1138        return rc;
1139}
1140
1141/**
1142 * smack_inode_rmdir - Smack check on directory deletion
1143 * @dir: containing directory object
1144 * @dentry: directory to unlink
1145 *
1146 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1147 * and the directory, error code otherwise
1148 */
1149static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1150{
1151        struct smk_audit_info ad;
1152        int rc;
1153
1154        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1155        smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1156
1157        /*
1158         * You need write access to the thing you're removing
1159         */
1160        rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1161        rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1162        if (rc == 0) {
1163                /*
1164                 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1165                 */
1166                smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1167                smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1168                rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1169                rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1170        }
1171
1172        return rc;
1173}
1174
1175/**
1176 * smack_inode_rename - Smack check on rename
1177 * @old_inode: unused
1178 * @old_dentry: the old object
1179 * @new_inode: unused
1180 * @new_dentry: the new object
1181 *
1182 * Read and write access is required on both the old and
1183 * new directories.
1184 *
1185 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1186 */
1187static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
1188                              struct dentry *old_dentry,
1189                              struct inode *new_inode,
1190                              struct dentry *new_dentry)
1191{
1192        int rc;
1193        struct smack_known *isp;
1194        struct smk_audit_info ad;
1195
1196        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1197        smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1198
1199        isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1200        rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1201        rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1202
1203        if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1204                isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1205                smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1206                rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1207                rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1208        }
1209        return rc;
1210}
1211
1212/**
1213 * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission()
1214 * @inode: the inode in question
1215 * @mask: the access requested
1216 *
1217 * This is the important Smack hook.
1218 *
1219 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, -EACCES otherwise
1220 */
1221static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
1222{
1223        struct superblock_smack *sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1224        struct smk_audit_info ad;
1225        int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
1226        int rc;
1227
1228        mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
1229        /*
1230         * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
1231         */
1232        if (mask == 0)
1233                return 0;
1234
1235        if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) {
1236                if (smk_of_inode(inode) != sbsp->smk_root)
1237                        return -EACCES;
1238        }
1239
1240        /* May be droppable after audit */
1241        if (no_block)
1242                return -ECHILD;
1243        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1244        smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
1245        rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
1246        rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, mask, rc);
1247        return rc;
1248}
1249
1250/**
1251 * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
1252 * @dentry: the object
1253 * @iattr: for the force flag
1254 *
1255 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1256 */
1257static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
1258{
1259        struct smk_audit_info ad;
1260        int rc;
1261
1262        /*
1263         * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit.
1264         */
1265        if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
1266                return 0;
1267        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1268        smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1269
1270        rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1271        rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1272        return rc;
1273}
1274
1275/**
1276 * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
1277 * @mnt: vfsmount of the object
1278 * @dentry: the object
1279 *
1280 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1281 */
1282static int smack_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
1283{
1284        struct smk_audit_info ad;
1285        struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1286        int rc;
1287
1288        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1289        smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
1290        rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1291        rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, MAY_READ, rc);
1292        return rc;
1293}
1294
1295/**
1296 * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
1297 * @dentry: the object
1298 * @name: name of the attribute
1299 * @value: value of the attribute
1300 * @size: size of the value
1301 * @flags: unused
1302 *
1303 * This protects the Smack attribute explicitly.
1304 *
1305 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1306 */
1307static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1308                                const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1309{
1310        struct smk_audit_info ad;
1311        struct smack_known *skp;
1312        int check_priv = 0;
1313        int check_import = 0;
1314        int check_star = 0;
1315        int rc = 0;
1316
1317        /*
1318         * Check label validity here so import won't fail in post_setxattr
1319         */
1320        if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1321            strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1322            strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
1323                check_priv = 1;
1324                check_import = 1;
1325        } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1326                   strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1327                check_priv = 1;
1328                check_import = 1;
1329                check_star = 1;
1330        } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1331                check_priv = 1;
1332                if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
1333                    strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
1334                        rc = -EINVAL;
1335        } else
1336                rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
1337
1338        if (check_priv && !smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1339                rc = -EPERM;
1340
1341        if (rc == 0 && check_import) {
1342                skp = size ? smk_import_entry(value, size) : NULL;
1343                if (IS_ERR(skp))
1344                        rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
1345                else if (skp == NULL || (check_star &&
1346                    (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)))
1347                        rc = -EINVAL;
1348        }
1349
1350        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1351        smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1352
1353        if (rc == 0) {
1354                rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1355                rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1356        }
1357
1358        return rc;
1359}
1360
1361/**
1362 * smack_inode_post_setxattr - Apply the Smack update approved above
1363 * @dentry: object
1364 * @name: attribute name
1365 * @value: attribute value
1366 * @size: attribute size
1367 * @flags: unused
1368 *
1369 * Set the pointer in the inode blob to the entry found
1370 * in the master label list.
1371 */
1372static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1373                                      const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1374{
1375        struct smack_known *skp;
1376        struct inode_smack *isp = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
1377
1378        if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1379                isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1380                return;
1381        }
1382
1383        if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
1384                skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1385                if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1386                        isp->smk_inode = skp;
1387                else
1388                        isp->smk_inode = &smack_known_invalid;
1389        } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
1390                skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1391                if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1392                        isp->smk_task = skp;
1393                else
1394                        isp->smk_task = &smack_known_invalid;
1395        } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1396                skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1397                if (!IS_ERR(skp))
1398                        isp->smk_mmap = skp;
1399                else
1400                        isp->smk_mmap = &smack_known_invalid;
1401        }
1402
1403        return;
1404}
1405
1406/**
1407 * smack_inode_getxattr - Smack check on getxattr
1408 * @dentry: the object
1409 * @name: unused
1410 *
1411 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1412 */
1413static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1414{
1415        struct smk_audit_info ad;
1416        int rc;
1417
1418        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1419        smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1420
1421        rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_READ, &ad);
1422        rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_READ, rc);
1423        return rc;
1424}
1425
1426/**
1427 * smack_inode_removexattr - Smack check on removexattr
1428 * @dentry: the object
1429 * @name: name of the attribute
1430 *
1431 * Removing the Smack attribute requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN
1432 *
1433 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1434 */
1435static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1436{
1437        struct inode_smack *isp;
1438        struct smk_audit_info ad;
1439        int rc = 0;
1440
1441        if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1442            strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1443            strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
1444            strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1445            strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
1446            strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1447                if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1448                        rc = -EPERM;
1449        } else
1450                rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
1451
1452        if (rc != 0)
1453                return rc;
1454
1455        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1456        smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1457
1458        rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1459        rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1460        if (rc != 0)
1461                return rc;
1462
1463        isp = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
1464        /*
1465         * Don't do anything special for these.
1466         *      XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN
1467         *      XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT
1468         */
1469        if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
1470                struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb;
1471                struct superblock_smack *sbsp = sbp->s_security;
1472
1473                isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default;
1474        } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0)
1475                isp->smk_task = NULL;
1476        else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0)
1477                isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
1478        else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
1479                isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1480
1481        return 0;
1482}
1483
1484/**
1485 * smack_inode_getsecurity - get smack xattrs
1486 * @inode: the object
1487 * @name: attribute name
1488 * @buffer: where to put the result
1489 * @alloc: unused
1490 *
1491 * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
1492 */
1493static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
1494                                   const char *name, void **buffer,
1495                                   bool alloc)
1496{
1497        struct socket_smack *ssp;
1498        struct socket *sock;
1499        struct super_block *sbp;
1500        struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode;
1501        struct smack_known *isp;
1502        int ilen;
1503        int rc = 0;
1504
1505        if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
1506                isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1507                ilen = strlen(isp->smk_known);
1508                *buffer = isp->smk_known;
1509                return ilen;
1510        }
1511
1512        /*
1513         * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
1514         */
1515        sbp = ip->i_sb;
1516        if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
1517                return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1518
1519        sock = SOCKET_I(ip);
1520        if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
1521                return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1522
1523        ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1524
1525        if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
1526                isp = ssp->smk_in;
1527        else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
1528                isp = ssp->smk_out;
1529        else
1530                return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1531
1532        ilen = strlen(isp->smk_known);
1533        if (rc == 0) {
1534                *buffer = isp->smk_known;
1535                rc = ilen;
1536        }
1537
1538        return rc;
1539}
1540
1541
1542/**
1543 * smack_inode_listsecurity - list the Smack attributes
1544 * @inode: the object
1545 * @buffer: where they go
1546 * @buffer_size: size of buffer
1547 */
1548static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
1549                                    size_t buffer_size)
1550{
1551        int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SMACK);
1552
1553        if (buffer != NULL && len <= buffer_size)
1554                memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, len);
1555
1556        return len;
1557}
1558
1559/**
1560 * smack_inode_getsecid - Extract inode's security id
1561 * @inode: inode to extract the info from
1562 * @secid: where result will be saved
1563 */
1564static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
1565{
1566        struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
1567
1568        *secid = isp->smk_inode->smk_secid;
1569}
1570
1571/*
1572 * File Hooks
1573 */
1574
1575/*
1576 * There is no smack_file_permission hook
1577 *
1578 * Should access checks be done on each read or write?
1579 * UNICOS and SELinux say yes.
1580 * Trusted Solaris, Trusted Irix, and just about everyone else says no.
1581 *
1582 * I'll say no for now. Smack does not do the frequent
1583 * label changing that SELinux does.
1584 */
1585
1586/**
1587 * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
1588 * @file: the object
1589 *
1590 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1591 * label list, so no allocation is done.
1592 *
1593 * f_security is the owner security information. It
1594 * isn't used on file access checks, it's for send_sigio.
1595 *
1596 * Returns 0
1597 */
1598static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
1599{
1600        struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
1601
1602        file->f_security = skp;
1603        return 0;
1604}
1605
1606/**
1607 * smack_file_free_security - clear a file security blob
1608 * @file: the object
1609 *
1610 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1611 * label list, so no memory is freed.
1612 */
1613static void smack_file_free_security(struct file *file)
1614{
1615        file->f_security = NULL;
1616}
1617
1618/**
1619 * smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls
1620 * @file: the object
1621 * @cmd: what to do
1622 * @arg: unused
1623 *
1624 * Relies heavily on the correct use of the ioctl command conventions.
1625 *
1626 * Returns 0 if allowed, error code otherwise
1627 */
1628static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1629                            unsigned long arg)
1630{
1631        int rc = 0;
1632        struct smk_audit_info ad;
1633        struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1634
1635        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1636        smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1637
1638        if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
1639                rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1640                rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1641        }
1642
1643        if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)) {
1644                rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1645                rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_READ, rc);
1646        }
1647
1648        return rc;
1649}
1650
1651/**
1652 * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking
1653 * @file: the object
1654 * @cmd: unused
1655 *
1656 * Returns 0 if current has lock access, error code otherwise
1657 */
1658static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
1659{
1660        struct smk_audit_info ad;
1661        int rc;
1662        struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1663
1664        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1665        smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1666        rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1667        rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1668        return rc;
1669}
1670
1671/**
1672 * smack_file_fcntl - Smack check on fcntl
1673 * @file: the object
1674 * @cmd: what action to check
1675 * @arg: unused
1676 *
1677 * Generally these operations are harmless.
1678 * File locking operations present an obvious mechanism
1679 * for passing information, so they require write access.
1680 *
1681 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1682 */
1683static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1684                            unsigned long arg)
1685{
1686        struct smk_audit_info ad;
1687        int rc = 0;
1688        struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1689
1690        switch (cmd) {
1691        case F_GETLK:
1692                break;
1693        case F_SETLK:
1694        case F_SETLKW:
1695                smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1696                smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1697                rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1698                rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1699                break;
1700        case F_SETOWN:
1701        case F_SETSIG:
1702                smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1703                smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1704                rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1705                rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1706                break;
1707        default:
1708                break;
1709        }
1710
1711        return rc;
1712}
1713
1714/**
1715 * smack_mmap_file :
1716 * Check permissions for a mmap operation.  The @file may be NULL, e.g.
1717 * if mapping anonymous memory.
1718 * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
1719 * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
1720 * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
1721 * @flags contains the operational flags.
1722 * Return 0 if permission is granted.
1723 */
1724static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
1725                           unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
1726                           unsigned long flags)
1727{
1728        struct smack_known *skp;
1729        struct smack_known *mkp;
1730        struct smack_rule *srp;
1731        struct task_smack *tsp;
1732        struct smack_known *okp;
1733        struct inode_smack *isp;
1734        struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
1735        int may;
1736        int mmay;
1737        int tmay;
1738        int rc;
1739
1740        if (file == NULL)
1741                return 0;
1742
1743        isp = file_inode(file)->i_security;
1744        if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
1745                return 0;
1746        sbsp = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_security;
1747        if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED &&
1748            isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)
1749                return -EACCES;
1750        mkp = isp->smk_mmap;
1751
1752        tsp = current_security();
1753        skp = smk_of_current();
1754        rc = 0;
1755
1756        rcu_read_lock();
1757        /*
1758         * For each Smack rule associated with the subject
1759         * label verify that the SMACK64MMAP also has access
1760         * to that rule's object label.
1761         */
1762        list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &skp->smk_rules, list) {
1763                okp = srp->smk_object;
1764                /*
1765                 * Matching labels always allows access.
1766                 */
1767                if (mkp->smk_known == okp->smk_known)
1768                        continue;
1769                /*
1770                 * If there is a matching local rule take
1771                 * that into account as well.
1772                 */
1773                may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject->smk_known,
1774                                       okp->smk_known,
1775                                       &tsp->smk_rules);
1776                if (may == -ENOENT)
1777                        may = srp->smk_access;
1778                else
1779                        may &= srp->smk_access;
1780                /*
1781                 * If may is zero the SMACK64MMAP subject can't
1782                 * possibly have less access.
1783                 */
1784                if (may == 0)
1785                        continue;
1786
1787                /*
1788                 * Fetch the global list entry.
1789                 * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
1790                 * can't have as much access as current.
1791                 */
1792                mmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1793                                        &mkp->smk_rules);
1794                if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
1795                        rc = -EACCES;
1796                        break;
1797                }
1798                /*
1799                 * If there is a local entry it modifies the
1800                 * potential access, too.
1801                 */
1802                tmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1803                                        &tsp->smk_rules);
1804                if (tmay != -ENOENT)
1805                        mmay &= tmay;
1806
1807                /*
1808                 * If there is any access available to current that is
1809                 * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject
1810                 * deny access.
1811                 */
1812                if ((may | mmay) != mmay) {
1813                        rc = -EACCES;
1814                        break;
1815                }
1816        }
1817
1818        rcu_read_unlock();
1819
1820        return rc;
1821}
1822
1823/**
1824 * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
1825 * @file: object in question
1826 *
1827 */
1828static void smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
1829{
1830        file->f_security = smk_of_current();
1831}
1832
1833/**
1834 * smack_file_send_sigiotask - Smack on sigio
1835 * @tsk: The target task
1836 * @fown: the object the signal come from
1837 * @signum: unused
1838 *
1839 * Allow a privileged task to get signals even if it shouldn't
1840 *
1841 * Returns 0 if a subject with the object's smack could
1842 * write to the task, an error code otherwise.
1843 */
1844static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
1845                                     struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
1846{
1847        struct smack_known *skp;
1848        struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security);
1849        struct file *file;
1850        int rc;
1851        struct smk_audit_info ad;
1852
1853        /*
1854         * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
1855         */
1856        file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
1857
1858        /* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
1859        skp = file->f_security;
1860        rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, NULL);
1861        rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
1862        if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
1863                rc = 0;
1864
1865        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1866        smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
1867        smack_log(skp->smk_known, tkp->smk_known, MAY_DELIVER, rc, &ad);
1868        return rc;
1869}
1870
1871/**
1872 * smack_file_receive - Smack file receive check
1873 * @file: the object
1874 *
1875 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1876 */
1877static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
1878{
1879        int rc;
1880        int may = 0;
1881        struct smk_audit_info ad;
1882        struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1883        struct socket *sock;
1884        struct task_smack *tsp;
1885        struct socket_smack *ssp;
1886
1887        if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1888                return 0;
1889
1890        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1891        smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1892
1893        if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
1894                sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
1895                ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1896                tsp = current_security();
1897                /*
1898                 * If the receiving process can't write to the
1899                 * passed socket or if the passed socket can't
1900                 * write to the receiving process don't accept
1901                 * the passed socket.
1902                 */
1903                rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, ssp->smk_out, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1904                rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1905                if (rc < 0)
1906                        return rc;
1907                rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_in, tsp->smk_task, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1908                rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1909                return rc;
1910        }
1911        /*
1912         * This code relies on bitmasks.
1913         */
1914        if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1915                may = MAY_READ;
1916        if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
1917                may |= MAY_WRITE;
1918
1919        rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), may, &ad);
1920        rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
1921        return rc;
1922}
1923
1924/**
1925 * smack_file_open - Smack dentry open processing
1926 * @file: the object
1927 * @cred: task credential
1928 *
1929 * Set the security blob in the file structure.
1930 * Allow the open only if the task has read access. There are
1931 * many read operations (e.g. fstat) that you can do with an
1932 * fd even if you have the file open write-only.
1933 *
1934 * Returns 0
1935 */
1936static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
1937{
1938        struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
1939        struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1940        struct smk_audit_info ad;
1941        int rc;
1942
1943        if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
1944                return 0;
1945
1946        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1947        smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1948        rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1949        rc = smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
1950
1951        return rc;
1952}
1953
1954/*
1955 * Task hooks
1956 */
1957
1958/**
1959 * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
1960 * @new: the new credentials
1961 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
1962 *
1963 * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification.  This must allocate all
1964 * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
1965 * complete without error.
1966 */
1967static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
1968{
1969        struct task_smack *tsp;
1970
1971        tsp = new_task_smack(NULL, NULL, gfp);
1972        if (tsp == NULL)
1973                return -ENOMEM;
1974
1975        cred->security = tsp;
1976
1977        return 0;
1978}
1979
1980
1981/**
1982 * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
1983 * @cred: the credentials in question
1984 *
1985 */
1986static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
1987{
1988        struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
1989        struct smack_rule *rp;
1990        struct list_head *l;
1991        struct list_head *n;
1992
1993        if (tsp == NULL)
1994                return;
1995        cred->security = NULL;
1996
1997        smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
1998
1999        list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
2000                rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list);
2001                list_del(&rp->list);
2002                kfree(rp);
2003        }
2004        kfree(tsp);
2005}
2006
2007/**
2008 * smack_cred_prepare - prepare new set of credentials for modification
2009 * @new: the new credentials
2010 * @old: the original credentials
2011 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
2012 *
2013 * Prepare a new set of credentials for modification.
2014 */
2015static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2016                              gfp_t gfp)
2017{
2018        struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
2019        struct task_smack *new_tsp;
2020        int rc;
2021
2022        new_tsp = new_task_smack(old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task, gfp);
2023        if (new_tsp == NULL)
2024                return -ENOMEM;
2025
2026        rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
2027        if (rc != 0)
2028                return rc;
2029
2030        rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel, &old_tsp->smk_relabel,
2031                                gfp);
2032        if (rc != 0)
2033                return rc;
2034
2035        new->security = new_tsp;
2036        return 0;
2037}
2038
2039/**
2040 * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
2041 * @new: the new credentials
2042 * @old: the original credentials
2043 *
2044 * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
2045 */
2046static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2047{
2048        struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
2049        struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
2050
2051        new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
2052        new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
2053        mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock);
2054        INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules);
2055
2056
2057        /* cbs copy rule list */
2058}
2059
2060/**
2061 * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
2062 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
2063 * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
2064 *
2065 * Set the security data for a kernel service.
2066 */
2067static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
2068{
2069        struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
2070        struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
2071
2072        if (skp == NULL)
2073                return -EINVAL;
2074
2075        new_tsp->smk_task = skp;
2076        return 0;
2077}
2078
2079/**
2080 * smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds
2081 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified
2082 * @inode: points to the inode to use as a reference
2083 *
2084 * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same
2085 * as the objective context of the specified inode
2086 */
2087static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
2088                                        struct inode *inode)
2089{
2090        struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
2091        struct task_smack *tsp = new->security;
2092
2093        tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
2094        tsp->smk_task = tsp->smk_forked;
2095        return 0;
2096}
2097
2098/**
2099 * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access
2100 * @p: the task object
2101 * @access: the access requested
2102 * @caller: name of the calling function for audit
2103 *
2104 * Return 0 if access is permitted
2105 */
2106static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access,
2107                                const char *caller)
2108{
2109        struct smk_audit_info ad;
2110        struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2111        int rc;
2112
2113        smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2114        smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2115        rc = smk_curacc(skp, access, &ad);
2116        rc = smk_bu_task(p, access, rc);
2117        return rc;
2118}
2119
2120/**
2121 * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
2122 * @p: the task object
2123 * @pgid: unused
2124 *
2125 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2126 */
2127static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2128{
2129        return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2130}
2131
2132/**
2133 * smack_task_getpgid - Smack access check for getpgid
2134 * @p: the object task
2135 *
2136 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2137 */
2138static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2139{
2140        return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2141}
2142
2143/**
2144 * smack_task_getsid - Smack access check for getsid
2145 * @p: the object task
2146 *
2147 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2148 */
2149static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2150{
2151        return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2152}
2153
2154/**
2155 * smack_task_getsecid - get the secid of the task
2156 * @p: the object task
2157 * @secid: where to put the result
2158 *
2159 * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
2160 */
2161static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
2162{
2163        struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2164
2165        *secid = skp->smk_secid;
2166}
2167
2168/**
2169 * smack_task_setnice - Smack check on setting nice
2170 * @p: the task object
2171 * @nice: unused
2172 *
2173 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2174 */
2175static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2176{
2177        return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2178}
2179
2180/**
2181 * smack_task_setioprio - Smack check on setting ioprio
2182 * @p: the task object
2183 * @ioprio: unused
2184 *
2185 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2186 */
2187static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
2188{
2189        return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2190}
2191
2192/**
2193 * smack_task_getioprio - Smack check on reading ioprio
2194 * @p: the task object
2195 *
2196 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2197 */
2198static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
2199{
2200        return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2201}
2202
2203/**
2204 * smack_task_setscheduler - Smack check on setting scheduler
2205 * @p: the task object
2206 * @policy: unused
2207 * @lp: unused
2208 *
2209 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2210 */
2211static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2212{
2213        return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2214}
2215
2216/**
2217 * smack_task_getscheduler - Smack check on reading scheduler
2218 * @p: the task object
2219 *
2220 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2221 */
2222static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2223{
2224        return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2225}
2226
2227/**
2228 * smack_task_movememory - Smack check on moving memory
2229 * @p: the task object
2230 *
2231 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2232 */
2233static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
2234{
2235        return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2236}
2237
2238/**
2239 * smack_task_kill - Smack check on signal delivery
2240 * @p: the task object
2241 * @info: unused
2242 * @sig: unused
2243 * @secid: identifies the smack to use in lieu of current's
2244 *
2245 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2246 *
2247 * The secid behavior is an artifact of an SELinux hack
2248 * in the USB code. Someday it may go away.
2249 */
2250static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
2251                           int sig, u32 secid)
2252{
2253        struct smk_audit_info ad;
2254        struct smack_known *skp;
2255        struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2256        int rc;
2257
2258        if (!sig)
2259                return 0; /* null signal; existence test */
2260
2261        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2262        smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2263        /*
2264         * Sending a signal requires that the sender
2265         * can write the receiver.
2266         */
2267        if (secid == 0) {
2268                rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
2269                rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
2270                return rc;
2271        }
2272        /*
2273         * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
2274         * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
2275         * we can't take privilege into account.
2276         */
2277        skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
2278        rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
2279        rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
2280        return rc;
2281}
2282
2283/**
2284 * smack_task_wait - Smack access check for waiting
2285 * @p: task to wait for
2286 *
2287 * Returns 0
2288 */
2289static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
2290{
2291        /*
2292         * Allow the operation to succeed.
2293         * Zombies are bad.
2294         * In userless environments (e.g. phones) programs
2295         * get marked with SMACK64EXEC and even if the parent
2296         * and child shouldn't be talking the parent still
2297         * may expect to know when the child exits.
2298         */
2299        return 0;
2300}
2301
2302/**
2303 * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
2304 * @p: task to copy from
2305 * @inode: inode to copy to
2306 *
2307 * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob
2308 */
2309static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
2310{
2311        struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
2312        struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
2313
2314        isp->smk_inode = skp;
2315}
2316
2317/*
2318 * Socket hooks.
2319 */
2320
2321/**
2322 * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob
2323 * @sk: the socket
2324 * @family: unused
2325 * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags
2326 *
2327 * Assign Smack pointers to current
2328 *
2329 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
2330 */
2331static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
2332{
2333        struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2334        struct socket_smack *ssp;
2335
2336        ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
2337        if (ssp == NULL)
2338                return -ENOMEM;
2339
2340        ssp->smk_in = skp;
2341        ssp->smk_out = skp;
2342        ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
2343
2344        sk->sk_security = ssp;
2345
2346        return 0;
2347}
2348
2349/**
2350 * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
2351 * @sk: the socket
2352 *
2353 * Clears the blob pointer
2354 */
2355static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
2356{
2357        kfree(sk->sk_security);
2358}
2359
2360/**
2361* smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
2362* @sip: the object end
2363*
2364* looks for host based access restrictions
2365*
2366* This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2367* hosts.  The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2368* taken before calling this function.
2369*
2370* Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2371*/
2372static struct smack_known *smack_ipv4host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
2373{
2374        struct smk_net4addr *snp;
2375        struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
2376
2377        if (siap->s_addr == 0)
2378                return NULL;
2379
2380        list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net4addr_list, list)
2381                /*
2382                 * we break after finding the first match because
2383                 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2384                 * so we have found the most specific match
2385                 */
2386                if (snp->smk_host.s_addr ==
2387                    (siap->s_addr & snp->smk_mask.s_addr))
2388                        return snp->smk_label;
2389
2390        return NULL;
2391}
2392
2393#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2394/*
2395 * smk_ipv6_localhost - Check for local ipv6 host address
2396 * @sip: the address
2397 *
2398 * Returns boolean true if this is the localhost address
2399 */
2400static bool smk_ipv6_localhost(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2401{
2402        __be16 *be16p = (__be16 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2403        __be32 *be32p = (__be32 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2404
2405        if (be32p[0] == 0 && be32p[1] == 0 && be32p[2] == 0 && be16p[6] == 0 &&
2406            ntohs(be16p[7]) == 1)
2407                return true;
2408        return false;
2409}
2410
2411/**
2412* smack_ipv6host_label - check host based restrictions
2413* @sip: the object end
2414*
2415* looks for host based access restrictions
2416*
2417* This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2418* hosts.  The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2419* taken before calling this function.
2420*
2421* Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2422*/
2423static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2424{
2425        struct smk_net6addr *snp;
2426        struct in6_addr *sap = &sip->sin6_addr;
2427        int i;
2428        int found = 0;
2429
2430        /*
2431         * It's local. Don't look for a host label.
2432         */
2433        if (smk_ipv6_localhost(sip))
2434                return NULL;
2435
2436        list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
2437                /*
2438                * we break after finding the first match because
2439                * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2440                * so we have found the most specific match
2441                */
2442                for (found = 1, i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
2443                        /*
2444                         * If the label is NULL the entry has
2445                         * been renounced. Ignore it.
2446                         */
2447                        if (snp->smk_label == NULL)
2448                                continue;
2449                        if ((sap->s6_addr16[i] & snp->smk_mask.s6_addr16[i]) !=
2450                            snp->smk_host.s6_addr16[i]) {
2451                                found = 0;
2452                                break;
2453                        }
2454                }
2455                if (found)
2456                        return snp->smk_label;
2457        }
2458
2459        return NULL;
2460}
2461#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
2462
2463/**
2464 * smack_netlabel - Set the secattr on a socket
2465 * @sk: the socket
2466 * @labeled: socket label scheme
2467 *
2468 * Convert the outbound smack value (smk_out) to a
2469 * secattr and attach it to the socket.
2470 *
2471 * Returns 0 on success or an error code
2472 */
2473static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
2474{
2475        struct smack_known *skp;
2476        struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2477        int rc = 0;
2478
2479        /*
2480         * Usually the netlabel code will handle changing the
2481         * packet labeling based on the label.
2482         * The case of a single label host is different, because
2483         * a single label host should never get a labeled packet
2484         * even though the label is usually associated with a packet
2485         * label.
2486         */
2487        local_bh_disable();
2488        bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
2489
2490        if (ssp->smk_out == smack_net_ambient ||
2491            labeled == SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
2492                netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
2493        else {
2494                skp = ssp->smk_out;
2495                rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &skp->smk_netlabel);
2496        }
2497
2498        bh_unlock_sock(sk);
2499        local_bh_enable();
2500
2501        return rc;
2502}
2503
2504/**
2505 * smack_netlbel_send - Set the secattr on a socket and perform access checks
2506 * @sk: the socket
2507 * @sap: the destination address
2508 *
2509 * Set the correct secattr for the given socket based on the destination
2510 * address and perform any outbound access checks needed.
2511 *
2512 * Returns 0 on success or an error code.
2513 *
2514 */
2515static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
2516{
2517        struct smack_known *skp;
2518        int rc;
2519        int sk_lbl;
2520        struct smack_known *hkp;
2521        struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2522        struct smk_audit_info ad;
2523
2524        rcu_read_lock();
2525        hkp = smack_ipv4host_label(sap);
2526        if (hkp != NULL) {
2527#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2528                struct lsm_network_audit net;
2529
2530                smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2531                ad.a.u.net->family = sap->sin_family;
2532                ad.a.u.net->dport = sap->sin_port;
2533                ad.a.u.net->v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;
2534#endif
2535                sk_lbl = SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET;
2536                skp = ssp->smk_out;
2537                rc = smk_access(skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2538                rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 host check", skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2539        } else {
2540                sk_lbl = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET;
2541                rc = 0;
2542        }
2543        rcu_read_unlock();
2544        if (rc != 0)
2545                return rc;
2546
2547        return smack_netlabel(sk, sk_lbl);
2548}
2549
2550#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2551/**
2552 * smk_ipv6_check - check Smack access
2553 * @subject: subject Smack label
2554 * @object: object Smack label
2555 * @address: address
2556 * @act: the action being taken
2557 *
2558 * Check an IPv6 access
2559 */
2560static int smk_ipv6_check(struct smack_known *subject,
2561                                struct smack_known *object,
2562                                struct sockaddr_in6 *address, int act)
2563{
2564#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2565        struct lsm_network_audit net;
2566#endif
2567        struct smk_audit_info ad;
2568        int rc;
2569
2570#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2571        smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2572        ad.a.u.net->family = PF_INET6;
2573        ad.a.u.net->dport = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
2574        if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2575                ad.a.u.net->v6info.saddr = address->sin6_addr;
2576        else
2577                ad.a.u.net->v6info.daddr = address->sin6_addr;
2578#endif
2579        rc = smk_access(subject, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2580        rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 check", subject, object, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2581        return rc;
2582}
2583#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
2584
2585#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2586/**
2587 * smk_ipv6_port_label - Smack port access table management
2588 * @sock: socket
2589 * @address: address
2590 *
2591 * Create or update the port list entry
2592 */
2593static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
2594{
2595        struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
2596        struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
2597        struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2598        struct smk_port_label *spp;
2599        unsigned short port = 0;
2600
2601        if (address == NULL) {
2602                /*
2603                 * This operation is changing the Smack information
2604                 * on the bound socket. Take the changes to the port
2605                 * as well.
2606                 */
2607                list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2608                        if (sk != spp->smk_sock)
2609                                continue;
2610                        spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2611                        spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2612                        return;
2613                }
2614                /*
2615                 * A NULL address is only used for updating existing
2616                 * bound entries. If there isn't one, it's OK.
2617                 */
2618                return;
2619        }
2620
2621        addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
2622        port = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
2623        /*
2624         * This is a special case that is safely ignored.
2625         */
2626        if (port == 0)
2627                return;
2628
2629        /*
2630         * Look for an existing port list entry.
2631         * This is an indication that a port is getting reused.
2632         */
2633        list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2634                if (spp->smk_port != port)
2635                        continue;
2636                spp->smk_port = port;
2637                spp->smk_sock = sk;
2638                spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2639                spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2640                return;
2641        }
2642
2643        /*
2644         * A new port entry is required.
2645         */
2646        spp = kzalloc(sizeof(*spp), GFP_KERNEL);
2647        if (spp == NULL)
2648                return;
2649
2650        spp->smk_port = port;
2651        spp->smk_sock = sk;
2652        spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2653        spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2654
2655        list_add(&spp->list, &smk_ipv6_port_list);
2656        return;
2657}
2658
2659/**
2660 * smk_ipv6_port_check - check Smack port access
2661 * @sock: socket
2662 * @address: address
2663 *
2664 * Create or update the port list entry
2665 */
2666static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
2667                                int act)
2668{
2669        struct smk_port_label *spp;
2670        struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2671        struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
2672        unsigned short port;
2673        struct smack_known *object;
2674
2675        if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
2676                skp = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2677                object = ssp->smk_in;
2678        } else {
2679                skp = ssp->smk_out;
2680                object = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2681        }
2682
2683        /*
2684         * The other end is a single label host.
2685         */
2686        if (skp != NULL && object != NULL)
2687                return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2688        if (skp == NULL)
2689                skp = smack_net_ambient;
2690        if (object == NULL)
2691                object = smack_net_ambient;
2692
2693        /*
2694         * It's remote, so port lookup does no good.
2695         */
2696        if (!smk_ipv6_localhost(address))
2697                return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2698
2699        /*
2700         * It's local so the send check has to have passed.
2701         */
2702        if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2703                return 0;
2704
2705        port = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
2706        list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2707                if (spp->smk_port != port)
2708                        continue;
2709                object = spp->smk_in;
2710                if (act == SMK_CONNECTING)
2711                        ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out;
2712                break;
2713        }
2714
2715        return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2716}
2717#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
2718
2719/**
2720 * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
2721 * @inode: the object
2722 * @name: attribute name
2723 * @value: attribute value
2724 * @size: size of the attribute
2725 * @flags: unused
2726 *
2727 * Sets the named attribute in the appropriate blob
2728 *
2729 * Returns 0 on success, or an error code
2730 */
2731static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2732                                   const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2733{
2734        struct smack_known *skp;
2735        struct inode_smack *nsp = inode->i_security;
2736        struct socket_smack *ssp;
2737        struct socket *sock;
2738        int rc = 0;
2739
2740        if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LONGLABEL || size == 0)
2741                return -EINVAL;
2742
2743        skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
2744        if (IS_ERR(skp))
2745                return PTR_ERR(skp);
2746
2747        if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
2748                nsp->smk_inode = skp;
2749                nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
2750                return 0;
2751        }
2752        /*
2753         * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
2754         */
2755        if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2756                return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2757
2758        sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
2759        if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
2760                return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2761
2762        ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2763
2764        if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
2765                ssp->smk_in = skp;
2766        else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
2767                ssp->smk_out = skp;
2768                if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
2769                        rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
2770                        if (rc != 0)
2771                                printk(KERN_WARNING
2772                                        "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
2773                                        __func__, -rc);
2774                }
2775        } else
2776                return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2777
2778#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2779        if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
2780                smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, NULL);
2781#endif
2782
2783        return 0;
2784}
2785
2786/**
2787 * smack_socket_post_create - finish socket setup
2788 * @sock: the socket
2789 * @family: protocol family
2790 * @type: unused
2791 * @protocol: unused
2792 * @kern: unused
2793 *
2794 * Sets the netlabel information on the socket
2795 *
2796 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2797 */
2798static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
2799                                    int type, int protocol, int kern)
2800{
2801        struct socket_smack *ssp;
2802
2803        if (sock->sk == NULL)
2804                return 0;
2805
2806        /*
2807         * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
2808         */
2809        if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
2810                ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2811                ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
2812                ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
2813        }
2814
2815        if (family != PF_INET)
2816                return 0;
2817        /*
2818         * Set the outbound netlbl.
2819         */
2820        return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
2821}
2822
2823#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2824/**
2825 * smack_socket_bind - record port binding information.
2826 * @sock: the socket
2827 * @address: the port address
2828 * @addrlen: size of the address
2829 *
2830 * Records the label bound to a port.
2831 *
2832 * Returns 0
2833 */
2834static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
2835                                int addrlen)
2836{
2837        if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
2838                smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address);
2839        return 0;
2840}
2841#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
2842
2843/**
2844 * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
2845 * @sock: the socket
2846 * @sap: the other end
2847 * @addrlen: size of sap
2848 *
2849 * Verifies that a connection may be possible
2850 *
2851 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2852 */
2853static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
2854                                int addrlen)
2855{
2856        int rc = 0;
2857#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
2858        struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap;
2859#endif
2860#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
2861        struct smack_known *rsp;
2862        struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2863#endif
2864
2865        if (sock->sk == NULL)
2866                return 0;
2867
2868        switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
2869        case PF_INET:
2870                if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
2871                        return -EINVAL;
2872                rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
2873                break;
2874        case PF_INET6:
2875                if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
2876                        return -EINVAL;
2877#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
2878                rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip);
2879                if (rsp != NULL)
2880                        rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
2881                                                SMK_CONNECTING);
2882#endif
2883#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2884                rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sip, SMK_CONNECTING);
2885#endif
2886                break;
2887        }
2888        return rc;
2889}
2890
2891/**
2892 * smack_flags_to_may - convert S_ to MAY_ values
2893 * @flags: the S_ value
2894 *
2895 * Returns the equivalent MAY_ value
2896 */
2897static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
2898{
2899        int may = 0;
2900
2901        if (flags & S_IRUGO)
2902                may |= MAY_READ;
2903        if (flags & S_IWUGO)
2904                may |= MAY_WRITE;
2905        if (flags & S_IXUGO)
2906                may |= MAY_EXEC;
2907
2908        return may;
2909}
2910
2911/**
2912 * smack_msg_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg_msg
2913 * @msg: the object
2914 *
2915 * Returns 0
2916 */
2917static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
2918{
2919        struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2920
2921        msg->security = skp;
2922        return 0;
2923}
2924
2925/**
2926 * smack_msg_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg_msg
2927 * @msg: the object
2928 *
2929 * Clears the blob pointer
2930 */
2931static void smack_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
2932{
2933        msg->security = NULL;
2934}
2935
2936/**
2937 * smack_of_shm - the smack pointer for the shm
2938 * @shp: the object
2939 *
2940 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
2941 */
2942static struct smack_known *smack_of_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2943{
2944        return (struct smack_known *)shp->shm_perm.security;
2945}
2946
2947/**
2948 * smack_shm_alloc_security - Set the security blob for shm
2949 * @shp: the object
2950 *
2951 * Returns 0
2952 */
2953static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2954{
2955        struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
2956        struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2957
2958        isp->security = skp;
2959        return 0;
2960}
2961
2962/**
2963 * smack_shm_free_security - Clear the security blob for shm
2964 * @shp: the object
2965 *
2966 * Clears the blob pointer
2967 */
2968static void smack_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2969{
2970        struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
2971
2972        isp->security = NULL;
2973}
2974
2975/**
2976 * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm
2977 * @shp : the object
2978 * @access : access requested
2979 *
2980 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2981 */
2982static int smk_curacc_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int access)
2983{
2984        struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
2985        struct smk_audit_info ad;
2986        int rc;
2987
2988#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2989        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
2990        ad.a.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.id;
2991#endif
2992        rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
2993        rc = smk_bu_current("shm", ssp, access, rc);
2994        return rc;
2995}
2996
2997/**
2998 * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm
2999 * @shp: the object
3000 * @shmflg: access requested
3001 *
3002 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3003 */
3004static int smack_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
3005{
3006        int may;
3007
3008        may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
3009        return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
3010}
3011
3012/**
3013 * smack_shm_shmctl - Smack access check for shm
3014 * @shp: the object
3015 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3016 *
3017 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3018 */
3019static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
3020{
3021        int may;
3022
3023        switch (cmd) {
3024        case IPC_STAT:
3025        case SHM_STAT:
3026                may = MAY_READ;
3027                break;
3028        case IPC_SET:
3029        case SHM_LOCK:
3030        case SHM_UNLOCK:
3031        case IPC_RMID:
3032                may = MAY_READWRITE;
3033                break;
3034        case IPC_INFO:
3035        case SHM_INFO:
3036                /*
3037                 * System level information.
3038                 */
3039                return 0;
3040        default:
3041                return -EINVAL;
3042        }
3043        return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
3044}
3045
3046/**
3047 * smack_shm_shmat - Smack access for shmat
3048 * @shp: the object
3049 * @shmaddr: unused
3050 * @shmflg: access requested
3051 *
3052 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3053 */
3054static int smack_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
3055                           int shmflg)
3056{
3057        int may;
3058
3059        may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
3060        return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
3061}
3062
3063/**
3064 * smack_of_sem - the smack pointer for the sem
3065 * @sma: the object
3066 *
3067 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
3068 */
3069static struct smack_known *smack_of_sem(struct sem_array *sma)
3070{
3071        return (struct smack_known *)sma->sem_perm.security;
3072}
3073
3074/**
3075 * smack_sem_alloc_security - Set the security blob for sem
3076 * @sma: the object
3077 *
3078 * Returns 0
3079 */
3080static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3081{
3082        struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
3083        struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
3084
3085        isp->security = skp;
3086        return 0;
3087}
3088
3089/**
3090 * smack_sem_free_security - Clear the security blob for sem
3091 * @sma: the object
3092 *
3093 * Clears the blob pointer
3094 */
3095static void smack_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3096{
3097        struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
3098
3099        isp->security = NULL;
3100}
3101
3102/**
3103 * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem
3104 * @sma : the object
3105 * @access : access requested
3106 *
3107 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3108 */
3109static int smk_curacc_sem(struct sem_array *sma, int access)
3110{
3111        struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
3112        struct smk_audit_info ad;
3113        int rc;
3114
3115#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3116        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3117        ad.a.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.id;
3118#endif
3119        rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
3120        rc = smk_bu_current("sem", ssp, access, rc);
3121        return rc;
3122}
3123
3124/**
3125 * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem
3126 * @sma: the object
3127 * @semflg: access requested
3128 *
3129 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3130 */
3131static int smack_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
3132{
3133        int may;
3134
3135        may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg);
3136        return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
3137}
3138
3139/**
3140 * smack_sem_shmctl - Smack access check for sem
3141 * @sma: the object
3142 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3143 *
3144 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3145 */
3146static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
3147{
3148        int may;
3149
3150        switch (cmd) {
3151        case GETPID:
3152        case GETNCNT:
3153        case GETZCNT:
3154        case GETVAL:
3155        case GETALL:
3156        case IPC_STAT:
3157        case SEM_STAT:
3158                may = MAY_READ;
3159                break;
3160        case SETVAL:
3161        case SETALL:
3162        case IPC_RMID:
3163        case IPC_SET:
3164                may = MAY_READWRITE;
3165                break;
3166        case IPC_INFO:
3167        case SEM_INFO:
3168                /*
3169                 * System level information
3170                 */
3171                return 0;
3172        default:
3173                return -EINVAL;
3174        }
3175
3176        return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
3177}
3178
3179/**
3180 * smack_sem_semop - Smack checks of semaphore operations
3181 * @sma: the object
3182 * @sops: unused
3183 * @nsops: unused
3184 * @alter: unused
3185 *
3186 * Treated as read and write in all cases.
3187 *
3188 * Returns 0 if access is allowed, error code otherwise
3189 */
3190static int smack_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
3191                           unsigned nsops, int alter)
3192{
3193        return smk_curacc_sem(sma, MAY_READWRITE);
3194}
3195
3196/**
3197 * smack_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg
3198 * @msq: the object
3199 *
3200 * Returns 0
3201 */
3202static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3203{
3204        struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
3205        struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
3206
3207        kisp->security = skp;
3208        return 0;
3209}
3210
3211/**
3212 * smack_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg
3213 * @msq: the object
3214 *
3215 * Clears the blob pointer
3216 */
3217static void smack_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3218{
3219        struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
3220
3221        kisp->security = NULL;
3222}
3223
3224/**
3225 * smack_of_msq - the smack pointer for the msq
3226 * @msq: the object
3227 *
3228 * Returns a pointer to the smack label entry
3229 */
3230static struct smack_known *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq)
3231{
3232        return (struct smack_known *)msq->q_perm.security;
3233}
3234
3235/**
3236 * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq
3237 * @msq : the msq
3238 * @access : access requested
3239 *
3240 * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise
3241 */
3242static int smk_curacc_msq(struct msg_queue *msq, int access)
3243{
3244        struct smack_known *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
3245        struct smk_audit_info ad;
3246        int rc;
3247
3248#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3249        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3250        ad.a.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.id;
3251#endif
3252        rc = smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad);
3253        rc = smk_bu_current("msq", msp, access, rc);
3254        return rc;
3255}
3256
3257/**
3258 * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue
3259 * @msq: the object
3260 * @msqflg: access requested
3261 *
3262 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3263 */
3264static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
3265{
3266        int may;
3267
3268        may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3269        return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
3270}
3271
3272/**
3273 * smack_msg_queue_msgctl - Smack access check for msg_queue
3274 * @msq: the object
3275 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3276 *
3277 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3278 */
3279static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
3280{
3281        int may;
3282
3283        switch (cmd) {
3284        case IPC_STAT:
3285        case MSG_STAT:
3286                may = MAY_READ;
3287                break;
3288        case IPC_SET:
3289        case IPC_RMID:
3290                may = MAY_READWRITE;
3291                break;
3292        case IPC_INFO:
3293        case MSG_INFO:
3294                /*
3295                 * System level information
3296                 */
3297                return 0;
3298        default:
3299                return -EINVAL;
3300        }
3301
3302        return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
3303}
3304
3305/**
3306 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
3307 * @msq: the object
3308 * @msg: unused
3309 * @msqflg: access requested
3310 *
3311 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3312 */
3313static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
3314                                  int msqflg)
3315{
3316        int may;
3317
3318        may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3319        return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
3320}
3321
3322/**
3323 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
3324 * @msq: the object
3325 * @msg: unused
3326 * @target: unused
3327 * @type: unused
3328 * @mode: unused
3329 *
3330 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3331 */
3332static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
3333                        struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
3334{
3335        return smk_curacc_msq(msq, MAY_READWRITE);
3336}
3337
3338/**
3339 * smack_ipc_permission - Smack access for ipc_permission()
3340 * @ipp: the object permissions
3341 * @flag: access requested
3342 *
3343 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3344 */
3345static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
3346{
3347        struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security;
3348        int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
3349        struct smk_audit_info ad;
3350        int rc;
3351
3352#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3353        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3354        ad.a.u.ipc_id = ipp->id;
3355#endif
3356        rc = smk_curacc(iskp, may, &ad);
3357        rc = smk_bu_current("svipc", iskp, may, rc);
3358        return rc;
3359}
3360
3361/**
3362 * smack_ipc_getsecid - Extract smack security id
3363 * @ipp: the object permissions
3364 * @secid: where result will be saved
3365 */
3366static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
3367{
3368        struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security;
3369
3370        *secid = iskp->smk_secid;
3371}
3372
3373/**
3374 * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
3375 * @opt_dentry: dentry where inode will be attached
3376 * @inode: the object
3377 *
3378 * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already.
3379 */
3380static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
3381{
3382        struct super_block *sbp;
3383        struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
3384        struct inode_smack *isp;
3385        struct smack_known *skp;
3386        struct smack_known *ckp = smk_of_current();
3387        struct smack_known *final;
3388        char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
3389        int transflag = 0;
3390        int rc;
3391        struct dentry *dp;
3392
3393        if (inode == NULL)
3394                return;
3395
3396        isp = inode->i_security;
3397
3398        mutex_lock(&isp->smk_lock);
3399        /*
3400         * If the inode is already instantiated
3401         * take the quick way out
3402         */
3403        if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_INSTANT)
3404                goto unlockandout;
3405
3406        sbp = inode->i_sb;
3407        sbsp = sbp->s_security;
3408        /*
3409         * We're going to use the superblock default label
3410         * if there's no label on the file.
3411         */
3412        final = sbsp->smk_default;
3413
3414        /*
3415         * If this is the root inode the superblock
3416         * may be in the process of initialization.
3417         * If that is the case use the root value out
3418         * of the superblock.
3419         */
3420        if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
3421                switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3422                case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3423                        /*
3424                         * The cgroup filesystem is never mounted,
3425                         * so there's no opportunity to set the mount
3426                         * options.
3427                         */
3428                        sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_star;
3429                        sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_star;
3430                        isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3431                        break;
3432                case TMPFS_MAGIC:
3433                        /*
3434                         * What about shmem/tmpfs anonymous files with dentry
3435                         * obtained from d_alloc_pseudo()?
3436                         */
3437                        isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3438                        break;
3439                case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
3440                        isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3441                        break;
3442                default:
3443                        isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3444                        break;
3445                }
3446                isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
3447                goto unlockandout;
3448        }
3449
3450        /*
3451         * This is pretty hackish.
3452         * Casey says that we shouldn't have to do
3453         * file system specific code, but it does help
3454         * with keeping it simple.
3455         */
3456        switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3457        case SMACK_MAGIC:
3458        case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
3459        case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
3460        case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3461                /*
3462                 * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
3463                 * that the smack file system doesn't do
3464                 * extended attributes.
3465                 *
3466                 * Casey says pipes are easy (?)
3467                 *
3468                 * Socket access is controlled by the socket
3469                 * structures associated with the task involved.
3470                 *
3471                 * Cgroupfs is special
3472                 */
3473                final = &smack_known_star;
3474                break;
3475        case DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC:
3476                /*
3477                 * devpts seems content with the label of the task.
3478                 * Programs that change smack have to treat the
3479                 * pty with respect.
3480                 */
3481                final = ckp;
3482                break;
3483        case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
3484                /*
3485                 * Casey says procfs appears not to care.
3486                 * The superblock default suffices.
3487                 */
3488                break;
3489        case TMPFS_MAGIC:
3490                /*
3491                 * Device labels should come from the filesystem,
3492                 * but watch out, because they're volitile,
3493                 * getting recreated on every reboot.
3494                 */
3495                final = &smack_known_star;
3496                /*
3497                 * No break.
3498                 *
3499                 * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
3500                 * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
3501                 * to set mount options simulate setting the
3502                 * superblock default.
3503                 */
3504        default:
3505                /*
3506                 * This isn't an understood special case.
3507                 * Get the value from the xattr.
3508                 */
3509
3510                /*
3511                 * UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data.
3512                 */
3513                if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
3514                        final = &smack_known_star;
3515                        break;
3516                }
3517                /*
3518                 * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
3519                 * Use the aforeapplied default.
3520                 * It would be curious if the label of the task
3521                 * does not match that assigned.
3522                 */
3523                if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
3524                        break;
3525                /*
3526                 * Get the dentry for xattr.
3527                 */
3528                dp = dget(opt_dentry);
3529                skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
3530                if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skp))
3531                        final = skp;
3532
3533                /*
3534                 * Transmuting directory
3535                 */
3536                if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
3537                        /*
3538                         * If this is a new directory and the label was
3539                         * transmuted when the inode was initialized
3540                         * set the transmute attribute on the directory
3541                         * and mark the inode.
3542                         *
3543                         * If there is a transmute attribute on the
3544                         * directory mark the inode.
3545                         */
3546                        if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_CHANGED) {
3547                                isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
3548                                rc = __vfs_setxattr(dp, inode,
3549                                        XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
3550                                        TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE,
3551                                        0);
3552                        } else {
3553                                rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, inode,
3554                                        XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, trattr,
3555                                        TRANS_TRUE_SIZE);
3556                                if (rc >= 0 && strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE,
3557                                                       TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
3558                                        rc = -EINVAL;
3559                        }
3560                        if (rc >= 0)
3561                                transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
3562                }
3563                /*
3564                 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
3565                 */
3566                skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
3567                if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3568                    skp == &smack_known_web)
3569                        skp = NULL;
3570                isp->smk_task = skp;
3571
3572                skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
3573                if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3574                    skp == &smack_known_web)
3575                        skp = NULL;
3576                isp->smk_mmap = skp;
3577
3578                dput(dp);
3579                break;
3580        }
3581
3582        if (final == NULL)
3583                isp->smk_inode = ckp;
3584        else
3585                isp->smk_inode = final;
3586
3587        isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag);
3588
3589unlockandout:
3590        mutex_unlock(&isp->smk_lock);
3591        return;
3592}
3593
3594/**
3595 * smack_getprocattr - Smack process attribute access
3596 * @p: the object task
3597 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3598 * @value: where to put the result
3599 *
3600 * Places a copy of the task Smack into value
3601 *
3602 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3603 */
3604static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
3605{
3606        struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
3607        char *cp;
3608        int slen;
3609
3610        if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
3611                return -EINVAL;
3612
3613        cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
3614        if (cp == NULL)
3615                return -ENOMEM;
3616
3617        slen = strlen(cp);
3618        *value = cp;
3619        return slen;
3620}
3621
3622/**
3623 * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting
3624 * @p: the object task
3625 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3626 * @value: the value to set
3627 * @size: the size of the value
3628 *
3629 * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
3630 * is permitted and only with privilege
3631 *
3632 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3633 */
3634static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
3635                             void *value, size_t size)
3636{
3637        struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
3638        struct cred *new;
3639        struct smack_known *skp;
3640        struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
3641        int rc;
3642
3643        /*
3644         * Changing another process' Smack value is too dangerous
3645         * and supports no sane use case.
3646         */
3647        if (p != current)
3648                return -EPERM;
3649
3650        if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
3651                return -EPERM;
3652
3653        if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
3654                return -EINVAL;
3655
3656        if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
3657                return -EINVAL;
3658
3659        skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
3660        if (IS_ERR(skp))
3661                return PTR_ERR(skp);
3662
3663        /*
3664         * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label.
3665         */
3666        if (skp == &smack_known_web)
3667                return -EPERM;
3668
3669        if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
3670                rc = -EPERM;
3671                list_for_each_entry(sklep, &tsp->smk_relabel, list)
3672                        if (sklep->smk_label == skp) {
3673                                rc = 0;
3674                                break;
3675                        }
3676                if (rc)
3677                        return rc;
3678        }
3679
3680        new = prepare_creds();
3681        if (new == NULL)
3682                return -ENOMEM;
3683
3684        tsp = new->security;
3685        tsp->smk_task = skp;
3686        /*
3687         * process can change its label only once
3688         */
3689        smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
3690
3691        commit_creds(new);
3692        return size;
3693}
3694
3695/**
3696 * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS
3697 * @sock: one sock
3698 * @other: the other sock
3699 * @newsk: unused
3700 *
3701 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3702 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3703 */
3704static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
3705                                     struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
3706{
3707        struct smack_known *skp;
3708        struct smack_known *okp;
3709        struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
3710        struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
3711        struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
3712        struct smk_audit_info ad;
3713        int rc = 0;
3714#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3715        struct lsm_network_audit net;
3716#endif
3717
3718        if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
3719                skp = ssp->smk_out;
3720                okp = osp->smk_in;
3721#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3722                smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3723                smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
3724#endif
3725                rc = smk_access(skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3726                rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3727                if (rc == 0) {
3728                        okp = osp->smk_out;
3729                        skp = ssp->smk_in;
3730                        rc = smk_access(okp, skp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3731                        rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", okp, skp,
3732                                                MAY_WRITE, rc);
3733                }
3734        }
3735
3736        /*
3737         * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC.
3738         */
3739        if (rc == 0) {
3740                nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out;
3741                ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out;
3742        }
3743
3744        return rc;
3745}
3746
3747/**
3748 * smack_unix_may_send - Smack access on UDS
3749 * @sock: one socket
3750 * @other: the other socket
3751 *
3752 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3753 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3754 */
3755static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
3756{
3757        struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3758        struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
3759        struct smk_audit_info ad;
3760        int rc;
3761
3762#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3763        struct lsm_network_audit net;
3764
3765        smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3766        smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
3767#endif
3768
3769        if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
3770                return 0;
3771
3772        rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3773        rc = smk_bu_note("UDS send", ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3774        return rc;
3775}
3776
3777/**
3778 * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
3779 * @sock: the socket
3780 * @msg: the message
3781 * @size: the size of the message
3782 *
3783 * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination host.
3784 * For IPv4 this is only a question if the destination is a single label host.
3785 * For IPv6 this is a check against the label of the port.
3786 */
3787static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3788                                int size)
3789{
3790        struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
3791#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3792        struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
3793#endif
3794#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3795        struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3796        struct smack_known *rsp;
3797#endif
3798        int rc = 0;
3799
3800        /*
3801         * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
3802         */
3803        if (sip == NULL)
3804                return 0;
3805
3806        switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
3807        case AF_INET:
3808                rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
3809                break;
3810        case AF_INET6:
3811#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3812                rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sap);
3813                if (rsp != NULL)
3814                        rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sap,
3815                                                SMK_CONNECTING);
3816#endif
3817#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
3818                rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_SENDING);
3819#endif
3820                break;
3821        }
3822        return rc;
3823}
3824
3825/**
3826 * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat pair to smack
3827 * @sap: netlabel secattr
3828 * @ssp: socket security information
3829 *
3830 * Returns a pointer to a Smack label entry found on the label list.
3831 */
3832static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
3833                                                struct socket_smack *ssp)
3834{
3835        struct smack_known *skp;
3836        int found = 0;
3837        int acat;
3838        int kcat;
3839
3840        if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
3841                /*
3842                 * Looks like a CIPSO packet.
3843                 * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
3844                 * behaving the way we expect it to.
3845                 *
3846                 * Look it up in the label table
3847                 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
3848                 * for the packet fall back on the network
3849                 * ambient value.
3850                 */
3851                rcu_read_lock();
3852                list_for_each_entry(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
3853                        if (sap->attr.mls.lvl != skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl)
3854                                continue;
3855                        /*
3856                         * Compare the catsets. Use the netlbl APIs.
3857                         */
3858                        if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0) {
3859                                if ((skp->smk_netlabel.flags &
3860                                     NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0)
3861                                        found = 1;
3862                                break;
3863                        }
3864                        for (acat = -1, kcat = -1; acat == kcat; ) {
3865                                acat = netlbl_catmap_walk(sap->attr.mls.cat,
3866                                                          acat + 1);
3867                                kcat = netlbl_catmap_walk(
3868                                        skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat,
3869                                        kcat + 1);
3870                                if (acat < 0 || kcat < 0)
3871                                        break;
3872                        }
3873                        if (acat == kcat) {
3874                                found = 1;
3875                                break;
3876                        }
3877                }
3878                rcu_read_unlock();
3879
3880                if (found)
3881                        return skp;
3882
3883                if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == &smack_known_star)
3884                        return &smack_known_web;
3885                return &smack_known_star;
3886        }
3887        if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0) {
3888                /*
3889                 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
3890                 */
3891                skp = smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
3892                /*
3893                 * This has got to be a bug because it is
3894                 * impossible to specify a fallback without
3895                 * specifying the label, which will ensure
3896                 * it has a secid, and the only way to get a
3897                 * secid is from a fallback.
3898                 */
3899                BUG_ON(skp == NULL);
3900                return skp;
3901        }
3902        /*
3903         * Without guidance regarding the smack value
3904         * for the packet fall back on the network
3905         * ambient value.
3906         */
3907        return smack_net_ambient;
3908}
3909
3910#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3911static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
3912{
3913        u8 nexthdr;
3914        int offset;
3915        int proto = -EINVAL;
3916        struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h;
3917        struct ipv6hdr *ip6;
3918        __be16 frag_off;
3919        struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3920        struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3921        struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3922
3923        sip->sin6_port = 0;
3924
3925        offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3926        ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3927        if (ip6 == NULL)
3928                return -EINVAL;
3929        sip->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;
3930
3931        nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3932        offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3933        offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3934        if (offset < 0)
3935                return -EINVAL;
3936
3937        proto = nexthdr;
3938        switch (proto) {
3939        case IPPROTO_TCP:
3940                th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3941                if (th != NULL)
3942                        sip->sin6_port = th->source;
3943                break;
3944        case IPPROTO_UDP:
3945                uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3946                if (uh != NULL)
3947                        sip->sin6_port = uh->source;
3948                break;
3949        case IPPROTO_DCCP:
3950                dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3951                if (dh != NULL)
3952                        sip->sin6_port = dh->dccph_sport;
3953                break;
3954        }
3955        return proto;
3956}
3957#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
3958
3959/**
3960 * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
3961 * @sk: socket
3962 * @skb: packet
3963 *
3964 * Returns 0 if the packet should be delivered, an error code otherwise
3965 */
3966static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3967{
3968        struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
3969        struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
3970        struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
3971        int rc = 0;
3972        struct smk_audit_info ad;
3973#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
3974        struct lsm_network_audit net;
3975#endif
3976#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3977        struct sockaddr_in6 sadd;
3978        int proto;
3979#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
3980
3981        switch (sk->sk_family) {
3982        case PF_INET:
3983#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
3984                /*
3985                 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
3986                 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
3987                 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
3988                 */
3989                if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
3990                        skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
3991                        goto access_check;
3992                }
3993#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
3994                /*
3995                 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
3996                 */
3997                netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
3998
3999                rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
4000                if (rc == 0)
4001                        skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
4002                else
4003                        skp = smack_net_ambient;
4004
4005                netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
4006
4007#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4008access_check:
4009#endif
4010#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4011                smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4012                ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
4013                ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4014                ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4015#endif
4016                /*
4017                 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
4018                 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
4019                 * This is the simplist possible security model
4020                 * for networking.
4021                 */
4022                rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4023                rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
4024                                        MAY_WRITE, rc);
4025                if (rc != 0)
4026                        netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, sk->sk_family, rc, 0);
4027                break;
4028#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4029        case PF_INET6:
4030                proto = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd);
4031                if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_TCP)
4032                        break;
4033#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4034                if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)
4035                        skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
4036                else
4037                        skp = smack_ipv6host_label(&sadd);
4038                if (skp == NULL)
4039                        skp = smack_net_ambient;
4040#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4041                smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4042                ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
4043                ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4044                ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4045#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4046                rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4047                rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
4048                                        MAY_WRITE, rc);
4049#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING */
4050#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4051                rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING);
4052#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
4053                break;
4054#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4055        }
4056
4057        return rc;
4058}
4059
4060/**
4061 * smack_socket_getpeersec_stream - pull in packet label
4062 * @sock: the socket
4063 * @optval: user's destination
4064 * @optlen: size thereof
4065 * @len: max thereof
4066 *
4067 * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
4068 */
4069static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
4070                                          char __user *optval,
4071                                          int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4072{
4073        struct socket_smack *ssp;
4074        char *rcp = "";
4075        int slen = 1;
4076        int rc = 0;
4077
4078        ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4079        if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
4080                rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
4081                slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
4082        }
4083
4084        if (slen > len)
4085                rc = -ERANGE;
4086        else if (copy_to_user(optval, rcp, slen) != 0)
4087                rc = -EFAULT;
4088
4089        if (put_user(slen, optlen) != 0)
4090                rc = -EFAULT;
4091
4092        return rc;
4093}
4094
4095
4096/**
4097 * smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label
4098 * @sock: the peer socket
4099 * @skb: packet data
4100 * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
4101 *
4102 * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
4103 */
4104static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
4105                                         struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4106
4107{
4108        struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
4109        struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
4110        struct smack_known *skp;
4111        int family = PF_UNSPEC;
4112        u32 s = 0;      /* 0 is the invalid secid */
4113        int rc;
4114
4115        if (skb != NULL) {
4116                if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4117                        family = PF_INET;
4118#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4119                else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4120                        family = PF_INET6;
4121#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4122        }
4123        if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL)
4124                family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4125
4126        switch (family) {
4127        case PF_UNIX:
4128                ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4129                s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
4130                break;
4131        case PF_INET:
4132#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4133                s = skb->secmark;
4134                if (s != 0)
4135                        break;
4136#endif
4137                /*
4138                 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
4139                 */
4140                if (sock != NULL && sock->sk != NULL)
4141                        ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4142                netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
4143                rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
4144                if (rc == 0) {
4145                        skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
4146                        s = skp->smk_secid;
4147                }
4148                netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
4149                break;
4150        case PF_INET6:
4151#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4152                s = skb->secmark;
4153#endif
4154                break;
4155        }
4156        *secid = s;
4157        if (s == 0)
4158                return -EINVAL;
4159        return 0;
4160}
4161
4162/**
4163 * smack_sock_graft - Initialize a newly created socket with an existing sock
4164 * @sk: child sock
4165 * @parent: parent socket
4166 *
4167 * Set the smk_{in,out} state of an existing sock based on the process that
4168 * is creating the new socket.
4169 */
4170static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4171{
4172        struct socket_smack *ssp;
4173        struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
4174
4175        if (sk == NULL ||
4176            (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
4177                return;
4178
4179        ssp = sk->sk_security;
4180        ssp->smk_in = skp;
4181        ssp->smk_out = skp;
4182        /* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
4183}
4184
4185/**
4186 * smack_inet_conn_request - Smack access check on connect
4187 * @sk: socket involved
4188 * @skb: packet
4189 * @req: unused
4190 *
4191 * Returns 0 if a task with the packet label could write to
4192 * the socket, otherwise an error code
4193 */
4194static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4195                                   struct request_sock *req)
4196{
4197        u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4198        struct smack_known *skp;
4199        struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
4200        struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
4201        struct sockaddr_in addr;
4202        struct iphdr *hdr;
4203        struct smack_known *hskp;
4204        int rc;
4205        struct smk_audit_info ad;
4206#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4207        struct lsm_network_audit net;
4208#endif
4209
4210#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4211        if (family == PF_INET6) {
4212                /*
4213                 * Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving
4214                 * via IPv6 sockets. Don't set up netlabel
4215                 * processing on IPv6.
4216                 */
4217                if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4218                        family = PF_INET;
4219                else
4220                        return 0;
4221        }
4222#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4223
4224#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4225        /*
4226         * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
4227         * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
4228         * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
4229         */
4230        if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
4231                skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
4232                goto access_check;
4233        }
4234#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
4235
4236        netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
4237        rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
4238        if (rc == 0)
4239                skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
4240        else
4241                skp = &smack_known_huh;
4242        netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
4243
4244#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4245access_check:
4246#endif
4247
4248#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4249        smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4250        ad.a.u.net->family = family;
4251        ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4252        ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4253#endif
4254        /*
4255         * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
4256         * here. Read access is not required.
4257         */
4258        rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4259        rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 connect", skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
4260        if (rc != 0)
4261                return rc;
4262
4263        /*
4264         * Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup
4265         * smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
4266         */
4267        req->peer_secid = skp->smk_secid;
4268
4269        /*
4270         * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
4271         * if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will
4272         * propagate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
4273         */
4274        hdr = ip_hdr(skb);
4275        addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
4276        rcu_read_lock();
4277        hskp = smack_ipv4host_label(&addr);
4278        rcu_read_unlock();
4279
4280        if (hskp == NULL)
4281                rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &skp->smk_netlabel);
4282        else
4283                netlbl_req_delattr(req);
4284
4285        return rc;
4286}
4287
4288/**
4289 * smack_inet_csk_clone - Copy the connection information to the new socket
4290 * @sk: the new socket
4291 * @req: the connection's request_sock
4292 *
4293 * Transfer the connection's peer label to the newly created socket.
4294 */
4295static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
4296                                 const struct request_sock *req)
4297{
4298        struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
4299        struct smack_known *skp;
4300
4301        if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
4302                skp = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
4303                ssp->smk_packet = skp;
4304        } else
4305                ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
4306}
4307
4308/*
4309 * Key management security hooks
4310 *
4311 * Casey has not tested key support very heavily.
4312 * The permission check is most likely too restrictive.
4313 * If you care about keys please have a look.
4314 */
4315#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4316
4317/**
4318 * smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob
4319 * @key: object
4320 * @cred: the credentials to use
4321 * @flags: unused
4322 *
4323 * No allocation required
4324 *
4325 * Returns 0
4326 */
4327static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
4328                           unsigned long flags)
4329{
4330        struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
4331
4332        key->security = skp;
4333        return 0;
4334}
4335
4336/**
4337 * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
4338 * @key: the object
4339 *
4340 * Clear the blob pointer
4341 */
4342static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
4343{
4344        key->security = NULL;
4345}
4346
4347/**
4348 * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
4349 * @key_ref: gets to the object
4350 * @cred: the credentials to use
4351 * @perm: requested key permissions
4352 *
4353 * Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
4354 * an error code otherwise
4355 */
4356static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
4357                                const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm)
4358{
4359        struct key *keyp;
4360        struct smk_audit_info ad;
4361        struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
4362        int request = 0;
4363        int rc;
4364
4365        keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
4366        if (keyp == NULL)
4367                return -EINVAL;
4368        /*
4369         * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
4370         * it may do so.
4371         */
4372        if (keyp->security == NULL)
4373                return 0;
4374        /*
4375         * This should not occur
4376         */
4377        if (tkp == NULL)
4378                return -EACCES;
4379#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4380        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
4381        ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
4382        ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
4383#endif
4384        if (perm & KEY_NEED_READ)
4385                request = MAY_READ;
4386        if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE | KEY_NEED_LINK | KEY_NEED_SETATTR))
4387                request = MAY_WRITE;
4388        rc = smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
4389        rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc);
4390        return rc;
4391}
4392
4393/*
4394 * smack_key_getsecurity - Smack label tagging the key
4395 * @key points to the key to be queried
4396 * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the
4397 * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs).
4398 * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
4399 * an error.
4400 * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
4401 */
4402static int smack_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
4403{
4404        struct smack_known *skp = key->security;
4405        size_t length;
4406        char *copy;
4407
4408        if (key->security == NULL) {
4409                *_buffer = NULL;
4410                return 0;
4411        }
4412
4413        copy = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
4414        if (copy == NULL)
4415                return -ENOMEM;
4416        length = strlen(copy) + 1;
4417
4418        *_buffer = copy;
4419        return length;
4420}
4421
4422#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
4423
4424/*
4425 * Smack Audit hooks
4426 *
4427 * Audit requires a unique representation of each Smack specific
4428 * rule. This unique representation is used to distinguish the
4429 * object to be audited from remaining kernel objects and also
4430 * works as a glue between the audit hooks.
4431 *
4432 * Since repository entries are added but never deleted, we'll use
4433 * the smack_known label address related to the given audit rule as
4434 * the needed unique representation. This also better fits the smack
4435 * model where nearly everything is a label.
4436 */
4437#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4438
4439/**
4440 * smack_audit_rule_init - Initialize a smack audit rule
4441 * @field: audit rule fields given from user-space (audit.h)
4442 * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
4443 * @rulestr: smack label to be audited
4444 * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
4445 *
4446 * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
4447 * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
4448 */
4449static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
4450{
4451        struct smack_known *skp;
4452        char **rule = (char **)vrule;
4453        *rule = NULL;
4454
4455        if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4456                return -EINVAL;
4457
4458        if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
4459                return -EINVAL;
4460
4461        skp = smk_import_entry(rulestr, 0);
4462        if (IS_ERR(skp))
4463                return PTR_ERR(skp);
4464
4465        *rule = skp->smk_known;
4466
4467        return 0;
4468}
4469
4470/**
4471 * smack_audit_rule_known - Distinguish Smack audit rules
4472 * @krule: rule of interest, in Audit kernel representation format
4473 *
4474 * This is used to filter Smack rules from remaining Audit ones.
4475 * If it's proved that this rule belongs to us, the
4476 * audit_rule_match hook will be called to do the final judgement.
4477 */
4478static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
4479{
4480        struct audit_field *f;
4481        int i;
4482
4483        for (i = 0; i < krule->field_count; i++) {
4484                f = &krule->fields[i];
4485
4486                if (f->type == AUDIT_SUBJ_USER || f->type == AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4487                        return 1;
4488        }
4489
4490        return 0;
4491}
4492
4493/**
4494 * smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ?
4495 * @secid: security id for identifying the object to test
4496 * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
4497 * @op: required testing operator
4498 * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
4499 * @actx: audit context associated with the check
4500 *
4501 * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
4502 * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
4503 */
4504static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
4505                                  struct audit_context *actx)
4506{
4507        struct smack_known *skp;
4508        char *rule = vrule;
4509
4510        if (unlikely(!rule)) {
4511                WARN_ONCE(1, "Smack: missing rule\n");
4512                return -ENOENT;
4513        }
4514
4515        if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4516                return 0;
4517
4518        skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
4519
4520        /*
4521         * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
4522         * both pointers will point to the same smack_known
4523         * label.
4524         */
4525        if (op == Audit_equal)
4526                return (rule == skp->smk_known);
4527        if (op == Audit_not_equal)
4528                return (rule != skp->smk_known);
4529
4530        return 0;
4531}
4532
4533/*
4534 * There is no need for a smack_audit_rule_free hook.
4535 * No memory was allocated.
4536 */
4537
4538#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4539
4540/**
4541 * smack_ismaclabel - check if xattr @name references a smack MAC label
4542 * @name: Full xattr name to check.
4543 */
4544static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
4545{
4546        return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0);
4547}
4548
4549
4550/**
4551 * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
4552 * @secid: incoming integer
4553 * @secdata: destination
4554 * @seclen: how long it is
4555 *
4556 * Exists for networking code.
4557 */
4558static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
4559{
4560        struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
4561
4562        if (secdata)
4563                *secdata = skp->smk_known;
4564        *seclen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
4565        return 0;
4566}
4567
4568/**
4569 * smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label
4570 * @secdata: smack label
4571 * @seclen: how long result is
4572 * @secid: outgoing integer
4573 *
4574 * Exists for audit and networking code.
4575 */
4576static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
4577{
4578        struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata);
4579
4580        if (skp)
4581                *secid = skp->smk_secid;
4582        else
4583                *secid = 0;
4584        return 0;
4585}
4586
4587/*
4588 * There used to be a smack_release_secctx hook
4589 * that did nothing back when hooks were in a vector.
4590 * Now that there's a list such a hook adds cost.
4591 */
4592
4593static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4594{
4595        return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
4596}
4597
4598static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4599{
4600        return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
4601}
4602
4603static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
4604{
4605        int len = 0;
4606        len = smack_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
4607
4608        if (len < 0)
4609                return len;
4610        *ctxlen = len;
4611        return 0;
4612}
4613
4614static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] = {
4615        LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
4616        LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
4617        LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
4618
4619        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
4620        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),
4621        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, smack_sb_copy_data),
4622        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, smack_sb_kern_mount),
4623        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
4624        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, smack_set_mnt_opts),
4625        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, smack_parse_opts_str),
4626
4627        LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds),
4628        LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, smack_bprm_committing_creds),
4629        LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, smack_bprm_secureexec),
4630
4631        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security),
4632        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, smack_inode_free_security),
4633        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, smack_inode_init_security),
4634        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, smack_inode_link),
4635        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, smack_inode_unlink),
4636        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, smack_inode_rmdir),
4637        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, smack_inode_rename),
4638        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, smack_inode_permission),
4639        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, smack_inode_setattr),
4640        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, smack_inode_getattr),
4641        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, smack_inode_setxattr),
4642        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, smack_inode_post_setxattr),
4643        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, smack_inode_getxattr),
4644        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, smack_inode_removexattr),
4645        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, smack_inode_getsecurity),
4646        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, smack_inode_setsecurity),
4647        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, smack_inode_listsecurity),
4648        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, smack_inode_getsecid),
4649
4650        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, smack_file_alloc_security),
4651        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, smack_file_free_security),
4652        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, smack_file_ioctl),
4653        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, smack_file_lock),
4654        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, smack_file_fcntl),
4655        LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, smack_mmap_file),
4656        LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
4657        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, smack_file_set_fowner),
4658        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, smack_file_send_sigiotask),
4659        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, smack_file_receive),
4660
4661        LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, smack_file_open),
4662
4663        LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, smack_cred_alloc_blank),
4664        LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free),
4665        LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare),
4666        LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer),
4667        LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as),
4668        LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as),
4669        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
4670        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
4671        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
4672        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, smack_task_getsecid),
4673        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
4674        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
4675        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),
4676        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, smack_task_setscheduler),
4677        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler),
4678        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory),
4679        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill),
4680        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, smack_task_wait),
4681        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode),
4682
4683        LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission),
4684        LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, smack_ipc_getsecid),
4685
4686        LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, smack_msg_msg_alloc_security),
4687        LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, smack_msg_msg_free_security),
4688
4689        LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, smack_msg_queue_alloc_security),
4690        LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, smack_msg_queue_free_security),
4691        LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, smack_msg_queue_associate),
4692        LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, smack_msg_queue_msgctl),
4693        LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, smack_msg_queue_msgsnd),
4694        LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, smack_msg_queue_msgrcv),
4695
4696        LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, smack_shm_alloc_security),
4697        LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, smack_shm_free_security),
4698        LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, smack_shm_associate),
4699        LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, smack_shm_shmctl),
4700        LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, smack_shm_shmat),
4701
4702        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, smack_sem_alloc_security),
4703        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, smack_sem_free_security),
4704        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, smack_sem_associate),
4705        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, smack_sem_semctl),
4706        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, smack_sem_semop),
4707
4708        LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, smack_d_instantiate),
4709
4710        LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, smack_getprocattr),
4711        LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, smack_setprocattr),
4712
4713        LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, smack_unix_stream_connect),
4714        LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, smack_unix_may_send),
4715
4716        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, smack_socket_post_create),
4717#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4718        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, smack_socket_bind),
4719#endif
4720        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, smack_socket_connect),
4721        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, smack_socket_sendmsg),
4722        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
4723        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
4724        LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
4725        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
4726        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
4727        LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
4728        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
4729        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
4730
4731 /* key management security hooks */
4732#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4733        LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc),
4734        LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, smack_key_free),
4735        LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission),
4736        LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity),
4737#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
4738
4739 /* Audit hooks */
4740#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
4741        LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, smack_audit_rule_init),
4742        LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, smack_audit_rule_known),
4743        LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, smack_audit_rule_match),
4744#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4745
4746        LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
4747        LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
4748        LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
4749        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
4750        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
4751        LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
4752};
4753
4754
4755static __init void init_smack_known_list(void)
4756{
4757        /*
4758         * Initialize rule list locks
4759         */
4760        mutex_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules_lock);
4761        mutex_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules_lock);
4762        mutex_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules_lock);
4763        mutex_init(&smack_known_star.smk_rules_lock);
4764        mutex_init(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules_lock);
4765        mutex_init(&smack_known_web.smk_rules_lock);
4766        /*
4767         * Initialize rule lists
4768         */
4769        INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules);
4770        INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules);
4771        INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_star.smk_rules);
4772        INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules);
4773        INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules);
4774        INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_web.smk_rules);
4775        /*
4776         * Create the known labels list
4777         */
4778        smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_huh);
4779        smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_hat);
4780        smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_star);
4781        smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_floor);
4782        smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_invalid);
4783        smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_web);
4784}
4785
4786/**
4787 * smack_init - initialize the smack system
4788 *
4789 * Returns 0
4790 */
4791static __init int smack_init(void)
4792{
4793        struct cred *cred;
4794        struct task_smack *tsp;
4795
4796        if (!security_module_enable("smack"))
4797                return 0;
4798
4799        smack_inode_cache = KMEM_CACHE(inode_smack, 0);
4800        if (!smack_inode_cache)
4801                return -ENOMEM;
4802
4803        tsp = new_task_smack(&smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor,
4804                                GFP_KERNEL);
4805        if (tsp == NULL) {
4806                kmem_cache_destroy(smack_inode_cache);
4807                return -ENOMEM;
4808        }
4809
4810        smack_enabled = 1;
4811
4812        pr_info("Smack:  Initializing.\n");
4813#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
4814        pr_info("Smack:  Netfilter enabled.\n");
4815#endif
4816#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4817        pr_info("Smack:  IPv6 port labeling enabled.\n");
4818#endif
4819#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4820        pr_info("Smack:  IPv6 Netfilter enabled.\n");
4821#endif
4822
4823        /*
4824         * Set the security state for the initial task.
4825         */
4826        cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
4827        cred->security = tsp;
4828
4829        /* initialize the smack_known_list */
4830        init_smack_known_list();
4831
4832        /*
4833         * Register with LSM
4834         */
4835        security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks));
4836
4837        return 0;
4838}
4839
4840/*
4841 * Smack requires early initialization in order to label
4842 * all processes and objects when they are created.
4843 */
4844security_initcall(smack_init);
4845