// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
 * MCE grading rules.
 * Copyright 2008, 2009 Intel Corporation.
 *
 * Author: Andi Kleen
 */
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>

#include <asm/mce.h>
#include <asm/intel-family.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/insn.h>
#include <asm/insn-eval.h>

#include "internal.h"

/*
 * Grade an mce by severity. In general the most severe ones are processed
 * first. Since there are quite a lot of combinations test the bits in a
 * table-driven way. The rules are simply processed in order, first
 * match wins.
 *
 * Note this is only used for machine check exceptions, the corrected
 * errors use much simpler rules. The exceptions still check for the corrected
 * errors, but only to leave them alone for the CMCI handler (except for
 * panic situations)
 */

enum context { IN_KERNEL = 1, IN_USER = 2, IN_KERNEL_RECOV = 3 };
enum ser { SER_REQUIRED = 1, NO_SER = 2 };
enum exception { EXCP_CONTEXT = 1, NO_EXCP = 2 };

static struct severity {
        u64 mask;
        u64 result;
        unsigned char sev;
        unsigned char mcgmask;
        unsigned char mcgres;
        unsigned char ser;
        unsigned char context;
        unsigned char excp;
        unsigned char covered;
        unsigned char cpu_model;
        unsigned char cpu_minstepping;
        unsigned char bank_lo, bank_hi;
        char *msg;
} severities[] = {
#define MCESEV(s, m, c...) { .sev = MCE_ ## s ## _SEVERITY, .msg = m, ## c }
#define BANK_RANGE(l, h) .bank_lo = l, .bank_hi = h
#define MODEL_STEPPING(m, s) .cpu_model = m, .cpu_minstepping = s
#define  KERNEL         .context = IN_KERNEL
#define  USER           .context = IN_USER
#define  KERNEL_RECOV   .context = IN_KERNEL_RECOV
#define  SER            .ser = SER_REQUIRED
#define  NOSER          .ser = NO_SER
#define  EXCP           .excp = EXCP_CONTEXT
#define  NOEXCP         .excp = NO_EXCP
#define  BITCLR(x)      .mask = x, .result = 0
#define  BITSET(x)      .mask = x, .result = x
#define  MCGMASK(x, y)  .mcgmask = x, .mcgres = y
#define  MASK(x, y)     .mask = x, .result = y
#define MCI_UC_S (MCI_STATUS_UC|MCI_STATUS_S)
#define MCI_UC_AR (MCI_STATUS_UC|MCI_STATUS_AR)
#define MCI_UC_SAR (MCI_STATUS_UC|MCI_STATUS_S|MCI_STATUS_AR)
#define MCI_ADDR (MCI_STATUS_ADDRV|MCI_STATUS_MISCV)

        MCESEV(
                NO, "Invalid",
                BITCLR(MCI_STATUS_VAL)
                ),
        MCESEV(
                NO, "Not enabled",
                EXCP, BITCLR(MCI_STATUS_EN)
                ),
        MCESEV(
                PANIC, "Processor context corrupt",
                BITSET(MCI_STATUS_PCC)
                ),
        /* When MCIP is not set something is very confused */
        MCESEV(
                PANIC, "MCIP not set in MCA handler",
                EXCP, MCGMASK(MCG_STATUS_MCIP, 0)
                ),
        /* Neither return not error IP -- no chance to recover -> PANIC */
        MCESEV(
                PANIC, "Neither restart nor error IP",
                EXCP, MCGMASK(MCG_STATUS_RIPV|MCG_STATUS_EIPV, 0)
                ),
        MCESEV(
                PANIC, "In kernel and no restart IP",
                EXCP, KERNEL, MCGMASK(MCG_STATUS_RIPV, 0)
                ),
        MCESEV(
                PANIC, "In kernel and no restart IP",
                EXCP, KERNEL_RECOV, MCGMASK(MCG_STATUS_RIPV, 0)
                ),
        MCESEV(
                KEEP, "Corrected error",
                NOSER, BITCLR(MCI_STATUS_UC)
                ),
        /*
         * known AO MCACODs reported via MCE or CMC:
         *
         * SRAO could be signaled either via a machine check exception or
         * CMCI with the corresponding bit S 1 or 0. So we don't need to
         * check bit S for SRAO.
         */
        MCESEV(
                AO, "Action optional: memory scrubbing error",
                SER, MASK(MCI_UC_AR|MCACOD_SCRUBMSK, MCI_STATUS_UC|MCACOD_SCRUB)
                ),
        MCESEV(
                AO, "Action optional: last level cache writeback error",
                SER, MASK(MCI_UC_AR|MCACOD, MCI_STATUS_UC|MCACOD_L3WB)
                ),
        /*
         * Quirk for Skylake/Cascade Lake. Patrol scrubber may be configured
         * to report uncorrected errors using CMCI with a special signature.
         * UC=0, MSCOD=0x0010, MCACOD=binary(000X 0000 1100 XXXX) reported
         * in one of the memory controller banks.
         * Set severity to "AO" for same action as normal patrol scrub error.
         */
        MCESEV(
                AO, "Uncorrected Patrol Scrub Error",
                SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_UC|MCI_ADDR|0xffffeff0, MCI_ADDR|0x001000c0),
                MODEL_STEPPING(INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 4), BANK_RANGE(13, 18)
        ),

        /* ignore OVER for UCNA */
        MCESEV(
                UCNA, "Uncorrected no action required",
                SER, MASK(MCI_UC_SAR, MCI_STATUS_UC)
                ),
        MCESEV(
                PANIC, "Illegal combination (UCNA with AR=1)",
                SER,
                MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR, MCI_STATUS_UC|MCI_STATUS_AR)
                ),
        MCESEV(
                KEEP, "Non signalled machine check",
                SER, BITCLR(MCI_STATUS_S)
                ),

        MCESEV(
                PANIC, "Action required with lost events",
                SER, BITSET(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR)
                ),

        /* known AR MCACODs: */
#ifdef  CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE
        MCESEV(
                KEEP, "Action required but unaffected thread is continuable",
                SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR, MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR),
                MCGMASK(MCG_STATUS_RIPV|MCG_STATUS_EIPV, MCG_STATUS_RIPV)
                ),
        MCESEV(
                AR, "Action required: data load in error recoverable area of kernel",
                SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD, MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD_DATA),
                KERNEL_RECOV
                ),
        MCESEV(
                AR, "Action required: data load error in a user process",
                SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD, MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD_DATA),
                USER
                ),
        MCESEV(
                AR, "Action required: instruction fetch error in a user process",
                SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD, MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD_INSTR),
                USER
                ),
        MCESEV(
                PANIC, "Data load in unrecoverable area of kernel",
                SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD, MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD_DATA),
                KERNEL
                ),
        MCESEV(
                PANIC, "Instruction fetch error in kernel",
                SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD, MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD_INSTR),
                KERNEL
                ),
#endif
        MCESEV(
                PANIC, "Action required: unknown MCACOD",
                SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR, MCI_UC_SAR)
                ),

        MCESEV(
                SOME, "Action optional: unknown MCACOD",
                SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR, MCI_UC_S)
                ),
        MCESEV(
                SOME, "Action optional with lost events",
                SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR, MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_S)
                ),

        MCESEV(
                PANIC, "Overflowed uncorrected",
                BITSET(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_STATUS_UC)
                ),
        MCESEV(
                UC, "Uncorrected",
                BITSET(MCI_STATUS_UC)
                ),
        MCESEV(
                SOME, "No match",
                BITSET(0)
                )       /* always matches. keep at end */
};

#define mc_recoverable(mcg) (((mcg) & (MCG_STATUS_RIPV|MCG_STATUS_EIPV)) == \
                                (MCG_STATUS_RIPV|MCG_STATUS_EIPV))

static bool is_copy_from_user(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
        u8 insn_buf[MAX_INSN_SIZE];
        struct insn insn;
        unsigned long addr;

        if (copy_from_kernel_nofault(insn_buf, (void *)regs->ip, MAX_INSN_SIZE))
                return false;

        kernel_insn_init(&insn, insn_buf, MAX_INSN_SIZE);
        insn_get_opcode(&insn);
        if (!insn.opcode.got)
                return false;

        switch (insn.opcode.value) {
        /* MOV mem,reg */
        case 0x8A: case 0x8B:
        /* MOVZ mem,reg */
        case 0xB60F: case 0xB70F:
                insn_get_modrm(&insn);
                insn_get_sib(&insn);
                if (!insn.modrm.got || !insn.sib.got)
                        return false;
                addr = (unsigned long)insn_get_addr_ref(&insn, regs);
                break;
        /* REP MOVS */
        case 0xA4: case 0xA5:
                addr = regs->si;
                break;
        default:
                return false;
        }

        if (fault_in_kernel_space(addr))
                return false;

        current->mce_vaddr = (void __user *)addr;

        return true;
}

/*
 * If mcgstatus indicated that ip/cs on the stack were
 * no good, then "m->cs" will be zero and we will have
 * to assume the worst case (IN_KERNEL) as we actually
 * have no idea what we were executing when the machine
 * check hit.
 * If we do have a good "m->cs" (or a faked one in the
 * case we were executing in VM86 mode) we can use it to
 * distinguish an exception taken in user from from one
 * taken in the kernel.
 */
static int error_context(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
        enum handler_type t;

        if ((m->cs & 3) == 3)
                return IN_USER;
        if (!mc_recoverable(m->mcgstatus))
                return IN_KERNEL;

        t = ex_get_fault_handler_type(m->ip);
        if (t == EX_HANDLER_FAULT) {
                m->kflags |= MCE_IN_KERNEL_RECOV;
                return IN_KERNEL_RECOV;
        }
        if (t == EX_HANDLER_UACCESS && regs && is_copy_from_user(regs)) {
                m->kflags |= MCE_IN_KERNEL_RECOV;
                m->kflags |= MCE_IN_KERNEL_COPYIN;
                return IN_KERNEL_RECOV;
        }

        return IN_KERNEL;
}

static int mce_severity_amd_smca(struct mce *m, enum context err_ctx)
{
        u32 addr = MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_CONFIG(m->bank);
        u32 low, high;

        /*
         * We need to look at the following bits:
         * - "succor" bit (data poisoning support), and
         * - TCC bit (Task Context Corrupt)
         * in MCi_STATUS to determine error severity.
         */
        if (!mce_flags.succor)
                return MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;

        if (rdmsr_safe(addr, &low, &high))
                return MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;

        /* TCC (Task context corrupt). If set and if IN_KERNEL, panic. */
        if ((low & MCI_CONFIG_MCAX) &&
            (m->status & MCI_STATUS_TCC) &&
            (err_ctx == IN_KERNEL))
                return MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;

         /* ...otherwise invoke hwpoison handler. */
        return MCE_AR_SEVERITY;
}

/*
 * See AMD Error Scope Hierarchy table in a newer BKDG. For example
 * 49125_15h_Models_30h-3Fh_BKDG.pdf, section "RAS Features"
 */
static int mce_severity_amd(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs, int tolerant,
                            char **msg, bool is_excp)
{
        enum context ctx = error_context(m, regs);

        /* Processor Context Corrupt, no need to fumble too much, die! */
        if (m->status & MCI_STATUS_PCC)
                return MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;

        if (m->status & MCI_STATUS_UC) {

                if (ctx == IN_KERNEL)
                        return MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;

                /*
                 * On older systems where overflow_recov flag is not present, we
                 * should simply panic if an error overflow occurs. If
                 * overflow_recov flag is present and set, then software can try
                 * to at least kill process to prolong system operation.
                 */
                if (mce_flags.overflow_recov) {
                        if (mce_flags.smca)
                                return mce_severity_amd_smca(m, ctx);

                        /* kill current process */
                        return MCE_AR_SEVERITY;
                } else {
                        /* at least one error was not logged */
                        if (m->status & MCI_STATUS_OVER)
                                return MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
                }

                /*
                 * For any other case, return MCE_UC_SEVERITY so that we log the
                 * error and exit #MC handler.
                 */
                return MCE_UC_SEVERITY;
        }

        /*
         * deferred error: poll handler catches these and adds to mce_ring so
         * memory-failure can take recovery actions.
         */
        if (m->status & MCI_STATUS_DEFERRED)
                return MCE_DEFERRED_SEVERITY;

        /*
         * corrected error: poll handler catches these and passes responsibility
         * of decoding the error to EDAC
         */
        return MCE_KEEP_SEVERITY;
}

static int mce_severity_intel(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs,
                              int tolerant, char **msg, bool is_excp)
{
        enum exception excp = (is_excp ? EXCP_CONTEXT : NO_EXCP);
        enum context ctx = error_context(m, regs);
        struct severity *s;

        for (s = severities;; s++) {
                if ((m->status & s->mask) != s->result)
                        continue;
                if ((m->mcgstatus & s->mcgmask) != s->mcgres)
                        continue;
                if (s->ser == SER_REQUIRED && !mca_cfg.ser)
                        continue;
                if (s->ser == NO_SER && mca_cfg.ser)
                        continue;
                if (s->context && ctx != s->context)
                        continue;
                if (s->excp && excp != s->excp)
                        continue;
                if (s->cpu_model && boot_cpu_data.x86_model != s->cpu_model)
                        continue;
                if (s->cpu_minstepping && boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping < s->cpu_minstepping)
                        continue;
                if (s->bank_lo && (m->bank < s->bank_lo || m->bank > s->bank_hi))
                        continue;
                if (msg)
                        *msg = s->msg;
                s->covered = 1;
                if (s->sev >= MCE_UC_SEVERITY && ctx == IN_KERNEL) {
                        if (tolerant < 1)
                                return MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
                }
                return s->sev;
        }
}

/* Default to mce_severity_intel */
int (*mce_severity)(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs, int tolerant, char **msg, bool is_excp) =
                    mce_severity_intel;

void __init mcheck_vendor_init_severity(void)
{
        if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
            boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
                mce_severity = mce_severity_amd;
}

#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
static void *s_start(struct seq_file *f, loff_t *pos)
{
        if (*pos >= ARRAY_SIZE(severities))
                return NULL;
        return &severities[*pos];
}

static void *s_next(struct seq_file *f, void *data, loff_t *pos)
{
        if (++(*pos) >= ARRAY_SIZE(severities))
                return NULL;
        return &severities[*pos];
}

static void s_stop(struct seq_file *f, void *data)
{
}

static int s_show(struct seq_file *f, void *data)
{
        struct severity *ser = data;
        seq_printf(f, "%d\t%s\n", ser->covered, ser->msg);
        return 0;
}

static const struct seq_operations severities_seq_ops = {
        .start  = s_start,
        .next   = s_next,
        .stop   = s_stop,
        .show   = s_show,
};

static int severities_coverage_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
        return seq_open(file, &severities_seq_ops);
}

static ssize_t severities_coverage_write(struct file *file,
                                         const char __user *ubuf,
                                         size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
        int i;
        for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(severities); i++)
                severities[i].covered = 0;
        return count;
}

static const struct file_operations severities_coverage_fops = {
        .open           = severities_coverage_open,
        .release        = seq_release,
        .read           = seq_read,
        .write          = severities_coverage_write,
        .llseek         = seq_lseek,
};

static int __init severities_debugfs_init(void)
{
        struct dentry *dmce;

        dmce = mce_get_debugfs_dir();

        debugfs_create_file("severities-coverage", 0444, dmce, NULL,
                            &severities_coverage_fops);
        return 0;
}
late_initcall(severities_debugfs_init);
#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */