1// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 2/* Copyright (c) 2018, Intel Corporation. */ 3 4#include "ice_common.h" 5#include "ice_sriov.h" 6 7/** 8 * ice_aq_send_msg_to_vf 9 * @hw: pointer to the hardware structure 10 * @vfid: VF ID to send msg 11 * @v_opcode: opcodes for VF-PF communication 12 * @v_retval: return error code 13 * @msg: pointer to the msg buffer 14 * @msglen: msg length 15 * @cd: pointer to command details 16 * 17 * Send message to VF driver (0x0802) using mailbox 18 * queue and asynchronously sending message via 19 * ice_sq_send_cmd() function 20 */ 21enum ice_status 22ice_aq_send_msg_to_vf(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vfid, u32 v_opcode, u32 v_retval, 23 u8 *msg, u16 msglen, struct ice_sq_cd *cd) 24{ 25 struct ice_aqc_pf_vf_msg *cmd; 26 struct ice_aq_desc desc; 27 28 ice_fill_dflt_direct_cmd_desc(&desc, ice_mbx_opc_send_msg_to_vf); 29 30 cmd = &desc.params.virt; 31 cmd->id = cpu_to_le32(vfid); 32 33 desc.cookie_high = cpu_to_le32(v_opcode); 34 desc.cookie_low = cpu_to_le32(v_retval); 35 36 if (msglen) 37 desc.flags |= cpu_to_le16(ICE_AQ_FLAG_RD); 38 39 return ice_sq_send_cmd(hw, &hw->mailboxq, &desc, msg, msglen, cd); 40} 41 42/** 43 * ice_conv_link_speed_to_virtchnl 44 * @adv_link_support: determines the format of the returned link speed 45 * @link_speed: variable containing the link_speed to be converted 46 * 47 * Convert link speed supported by HW to link speed supported by virtchnl. 48 * If adv_link_support is true, then return link speed in Mbps. Else return 49 * link speed as a VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_* casted to a u32. Note that the caller 50 * needs to cast back to an enum virtchnl_link_speed in the case where 51 * adv_link_support is false, but when adv_link_support is true the caller can 52 * expect the speed in Mbps. 53 */ 54u32 ice_conv_link_speed_to_virtchnl(bool adv_link_support, u16 link_speed) 55{ 56 u32 speed; 57 58 if (adv_link_support) 59 switch (link_speed) { 60 case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_10MB: 61 speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_10MBPS; 62 break; 63 case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_100MB: 64 speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_100MBPS; 65 break; 66 case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_1000MB: 67 speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_1000MBPS; 68 break; 69 case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_2500MB: 70 speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_2500MBPS; 71 break; 72 case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_5GB: 73 speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_5000MBPS; 74 break; 75 case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_10GB: 76 speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_10000MBPS; 77 break; 78 case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_20GB: 79 speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_20000MBPS; 80 break; 81 case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_25GB: 82 speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_25000MBPS; 83 break; 84 case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_40GB: 85 speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_40000MBPS; 86 break; 87 case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_50GB: 88 speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_50000MBPS; 89 break; 90 case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_100GB: 91 speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_100000MBPS; 92 break; 93 default: 94 speed = ICE_LINK_SPEED_UNKNOWN; 95 break; 96 } 97 else 98 /* Virtchnl speeds are not defined for every speed supported in 99 * the hardware. To maintain compatibility with older AVF 100 * drivers, while reporting the speed the new speed values are 101 * resolved to the closest known virtchnl speeds 102 */ 103 switch (link_speed) { 104 case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_10MB: 105 case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_100MB: 106 speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_100MB; 107 break; 108 case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_1000MB: 109 case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_2500MB: 110 case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_5GB: 111 speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_1GB; 112 break; 113 case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_10GB: 114 speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_10GB; 115 break; 116 case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_20GB: 117 speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_20GB; 118 break; 119 case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_25GB: 120 speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_25GB; 121 break; 122 case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_40GB: 123 case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_50GB: 124 case ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_100GB: 125 speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_40GB; 126 break; 127 default: 128 speed = (u32)VIRTCHNL_LINK_SPEED_UNKNOWN; 129 break; 130 } 131 132 return speed; 133} 134 135/* The mailbox overflow detection algorithm helps to check if there 136 * is a possibility of a malicious VF transmitting too many MBX messages to the 137 * PF. 138 * 1. The mailbox snapshot structure, ice_mbx_snapshot, is initialized during 139 * driver initialization in ice_init_hw() using ice_mbx_init_snapshot(). 140 * The struct ice_mbx_snapshot helps to track and traverse a static window of 141 * messages within the mailbox queue while looking for a malicious VF. 142 * 143 * 2. When the caller starts processing its mailbox queue in response to an 144 * interrupt, the structure ice_mbx_snapshot is expected to be cleared before 145 * the algorithm can be run for the first time for that interrupt. This can be 146 * done via ice_mbx_reset_snapshot(). 147 * 148 * 3. For every message read by the caller from the MBX Queue, the caller must 149 * call the detection algorithm's entry function ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(). 150 * Before every call to ice_mbx_vf_state_handler() the struct ice_mbx_data is 151 * filled as it is required to be passed to the algorithm. 152 * 153 * 4. Every time a message is read from the MBX queue, a VFId is received which 154 * is passed to the state handler. The boolean output is_malvf of the state 155 * handler ice_mbx_vf_state_handler() serves as an indicator to the caller 156 * whether this VF is malicious or not. 157 * 158 * 5. When a VF is identified to be malicious, the caller can send a message 159 * to the system administrator. The caller can invoke ice_mbx_report_malvf() 160 * to help determine if a malicious VF is to be reported or not. This function 161 * requires the caller to maintain a global bitmap to track all malicious VFs 162 * and pass that to ice_mbx_report_malvf() along with the VFID which was identified 163 * to be malicious by ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(). 164 * 165 * 6. The global bitmap maintained by PF can be cleared completely if PF is in 166 * reset or the bit corresponding to a VF can be cleared if that VF is in reset. 167 * When a VF is shut down and brought back up, we assume that the new VF 168 * brought up is not malicious and hence report it if found malicious. 169 * 170 * 7. The function ice_mbx_reset_snapshot() is called to reset the information 171 * in ice_mbx_snapshot for every new mailbox interrupt handled. 172 * 173 * 8. The memory allocated for variables in ice_mbx_snapshot is de-allocated 174 * when driver is unloaded. 175 */ 176#define ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(rq_data) ((rq_data) & PF_MBX_ARQH_ARQH_M) 177/* Using the highest value for an unsigned 16-bit value 0xFFFF to indicate that 178 * the max messages check must be ignored in the algorithm 179 */ 180#define ICE_IGNORE_MAX_MSG_CNT 0xFFFF 181 182/** 183 * ice_mbx_traverse - Pass through mailbox snapshot 184 * @hw: pointer to the HW struct 185 * @new_state: new algorithm state 186 * 187 * Traversing the mailbox static snapshot without checking 188 * for malicious VFs. 189 */ 190static void 191ice_mbx_traverse(struct ice_hw *hw, 192 enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state *new_state) 193{ 194 struct ice_mbx_snap_buffer_data *snap_buf; 195 u32 num_iterations; 196 197 snap_buf = &hw->mbx_snapshot.mbx_buf; 198 199 /* As mailbox buffer is circular, applying a mask 200 * on the incremented iteration count. 201 */ 202 num_iterations = ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(++snap_buf->num_iterations); 203 204 /* Checking either of the below conditions to exit snapshot traversal: 205 * Condition-1: If the number of iterations in the mailbox is equal to 206 * the mailbox head which would indicate that we have reached the end 207 * of the static snapshot. 208 * Condition-2: If the maximum messages serviced in the mailbox for a 209 * given interrupt is the highest possible value then there is no need 210 * to check if the number of messages processed is equal to it. If not 211 * check if the number of messages processed is greater than or equal 212 * to the maximum number of mailbox entries serviced in current work item. 213 */ 214 if (num_iterations == snap_buf->head || 215 (snap_buf->max_num_msgs_mbx < ICE_IGNORE_MAX_MSG_CNT && 216 ++snap_buf->num_msg_proc >= snap_buf->max_num_msgs_mbx)) 217 *new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT; 218} 219 220/** 221 * ice_mbx_detect_malvf - Detect malicious VF in snapshot 222 * @hw: pointer to the HW struct 223 * @vf_id: relative virtual function ID 224 * @new_state: new algorithm state 225 * @is_malvf: boolean output to indicate if VF is malicious 226 * 227 * This function tracks the number of asynchronous messages 228 * sent per VF and marks the VF as malicious if it exceeds 229 * the permissible number of messages to send. 230 */ 231static enum ice_status 232ice_mbx_detect_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_id, 233 enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state *new_state, 234 bool *is_malvf) 235{ 236 struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot; 237 238 if (vf_id >= snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len) 239 return ICE_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE; 240 241 /* increment the message count in the VF array */ 242 snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr[vf_id]++; 243 244 if (snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr[vf_id] >= ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD) 245 *is_malvf = true; 246 247 /* continue to iterate through the mailbox snapshot */ 248 ice_mbx_traverse(hw, new_state); 249 250 return 0; 251} 252 253/** 254 * ice_mbx_reset_snapshot - Reset mailbox snapshot structure 255 * @snap: pointer to mailbox snapshot structure in the ice_hw struct 256 * 257 * Reset the mailbox snapshot structure and clear VF counter array. 258 */ 259static void ice_mbx_reset_snapshot(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap) 260{ 261 u32 vfcntr_len; 262 263 if (!snap || !snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr) 264 return; 265 266 /* Clear VF counters. */ 267 vfcntr_len = snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len; 268 if (vfcntr_len) 269 memset(snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr, 0, 270 (vfcntr_len * sizeof(*snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr))); 271 272 /* Reset mailbox snapshot for a new capture. */ 273 memset(&snap->mbx_buf, 0, sizeof(snap->mbx_buf)); 274 snap->mbx_buf.state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT; 275} 276 277/** 278 * ice_mbx_vf_state_handler - Handle states of the overflow algorithm 279 * @hw: pointer to the HW struct 280 * @mbx_data: pointer to structure containing mailbox data 281 * @vf_id: relative virtual function (VF) ID 282 * @is_malvf: boolean output to indicate if VF is malicious 283 * 284 * The function serves as an entry point for the malicious VF 285 * detection algorithm by handling the different states and state 286 * transitions of the algorithm: 287 * New snapshot: This state is entered when creating a new static 288 * snapshot. The data from any previous mailbox snapshot is 289 * cleared and a new capture of the mailbox head and tail is 290 * logged. This will be the new static snapshot to detect 291 * asynchronous messages sent by VFs. On capturing the snapshot 292 * and depending on whether the number of pending messages in that 293 * snapshot exceed the watermark value, the state machine enters 294 * traverse or detect states. 295 * Traverse: If pending message count is below watermark then iterate 296 * through the snapshot without any action on VF. 297 * Detect: If pending message count exceeds watermark traverse 298 * the static snapshot and look for a malicious VF. 299 */ 300enum ice_status 301ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw, 302 struct ice_mbx_data *mbx_data, u16 vf_id, 303 bool *is_malvf) 304{ 305 struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot; 306 struct ice_mbx_snap_buffer_data *snap_buf; 307 struct ice_ctl_q_info *cq = &hw->mailboxq; 308 enum ice_mbx_snapshot_state new_state; 309 enum ice_status status = 0; 310 311 if (!is_malvf || !mbx_data) 312 return ICE_ERR_BAD_PTR; 313 314 /* When entering the mailbox state machine assume that the VF 315 * is not malicious until detected. 316 */ 317 *is_malvf = false; 318 319 /* Checking if max messages allowed to be processed while servicing current 320 * interrupt is not less than the defined AVF message threshold. 321 */ 322 if (mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx <= ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD) 323 return ICE_ERR_INVAL_SIZE; 324 325 /* The watermark value should not be lesser than the threshold limit 326 * set for the number of asynchronous messages a VF can send to mailbox 327 * nor should it be greater than the maximum number of messages in the 328 * mailbox serviced in current interrupt. 329 */ 330 if (mbx_data->async_watermark_val < ICE_ASYNC_VF_MSG_THRESHOLD || 331 mbx_data->async_watermark_val > mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx) 332 return ICE_ERR_PARAM; 333 334 new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_INVALID; 335 snap_buf = &snap->mbx_buf; 336 337 switch (snap_buf->state) { 338 case ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT: 339 /* Clear any previously held data in mailbox snapshot structure. */ 340 ice_mbx_reset_snapshot(snap); 341 342 /* Collect the pending ARQ count, number of messages processed and 343 * the maximum number of messages allowed to be processed from the 344 * Mailbox for current interrupt. 345 */ 346 snap_buf->num_pending_arq = mbx_data->num_pending_arq; 347 snap_buf->num_msg_proc = mbx_data->num_msg_proc; 348 snap_buf->max_num_msgs_mbx = mbx_data->max_num_msgs_mbx; 349 350 /* Capture a new static snapshot of the mailbox by logging the 351 * head and tail of snapshot and set num_iterations to the tail 352 * value to mark the start of the iteration through the snapshot. 353 */ 354 snap_buf->head = ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(cq->rq.next_to_clean + 355 mbx_data->num_pending_arq); 356 snap_buf->tail = ICE_RQ_DATA_MASK(cq->rq.next_to_clean - 1); 357 snap_buf->num_iterations = snap_buf->tail; 358 359 /* Pending ARQ messages returned by ice_clean_rq_elem 360 * is the difference between the head and tail of the 361 * mailbox queue. Comparing this value against the watermark 362 * helps to check if we potentially have malicious VFs. 363 */ 364 if (snap_buf->num_pending_arq >= 365 mbx_data->async_watermark_val) { 366 new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT; 367 status = ice_mbx_detect_malvf(hw, vf_id, &new_state, is_malvf); 368 } else { 369 new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_TRAVERSE; 370 ice_mbx_traverse(hw, &new_state); 371 } 372 break; 373 374 case ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_TRAVERSE: 375 new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_TRAVERSE; 376 ice_mbx_traverse(hw, &new_state); 377 break; 378 379 case ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT: 380 new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_DETECT; 381 status = ice_mbx_detect_malvf(hw, vf_id, &new_state, is_malvf); 382 break; 383 384 default: 385 new_state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_INVALID; 386 status = ICE_ERR_CFG; 387 } 388 389 snap_buf->state = new_state; 390 391 return status; 392} 393 394/** 395 * ice_mbx_report_malvf - Track and note malicious VF 396 * @hw: pointer to the HW struct 397 * @all_malvfs: all malicious VFs tracked by PF 398 * @bitmap_len: length of bitmap in bits 399 * @vf_id: relative virtual function ID of the malicious VF 400 * @report_malvf: boolean to indicate if malicious VF must be reported 401 * 402 * This function will update a bitmap that keeps track of the malicious 403 * VFs attached to the PF. A malicious VF must be reported only once if 404 * discovered between VF resets or loading so the function checks 405 * the input vf_id against the bitmap to verify if the VF has been 406 * detected in any previous mailbox iterations. 407 */ 408enum ice_status 409ice_mbx_report_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, unsigned long *all_malvfs, 410 u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id, bool *report_malvf) 411{ 412 if (!all_malvfs || !report_malvf) 413 return ICE_ERR_PARAM; 414 415 *report_malvf = false; 416 417 if (bitmap_len < hw->mbx_snapshot.mbx_vf.vfcntr_len) 418 return ICE_ERR_INVAL_SIZE; 419 420 if (vf_id >= bitmap_len) 421 return ICE_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE; 422 423 /* If the vf_id is found in the bitmap set bit and boolean to true */ 424 if (!test_and_set_bit(vf_id, all_malvfs)) 425 *report_malvf = true; 426 427 return 0; 428} 429 430/** 431 * ice_mbx_clear_malvf - Clear VF bitmap and counter for VF ID 432 * @snap: pointer to the mailbox snapshot structure 433 * @all_malvfs: all malicious VFs tracked by PF 434 * @bitmap_len: length of bitmap in bits 435 * @vf_id: relative virtual function ID of the malicious VF 436 * 437 * In case of a VF reset, this function can be called to clear 438 * the bit corresponding to the VF ID in the bitmap tracking all 439 * malicious VFs attached to the PF. The function also clears the 440 * VF counter array at the index of the VF ID. This is to ensure 441 * that the new VF loaded is not considered malicious before going 442 * through the overflow detection algorithm. 443 */ 444enum ice_status 445ice_mbx_clear_malvf(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap, unsigned long *all_malvfs, 446 u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id) 447{ 448 if (!snap || !all_malvfs) 449 return ICE_ERR_PARAM; 450 451 if (bitmap_len < snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len) 452 return ICE_ERR_INVAL_SIZE; 453 454 /* Ensure VF ID value is not larger than bitmap or VF counter length */ 455 if (vf_id >= bitmap_len || vf_id >= snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len) 456 return ICE_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE; 457 458 /* Clear VF ID bit in the bitmap tracking malicious VFs attached to PF */ 459 clear_bit(vf_id, all_malvfs); 460 461 /* Clear the VF counter in the mailbox snapshot structure for that VF ID. 462 * This is to ensure that if a VF is unloaded and a new one brought back 463 * up with the same VF ID for a snapshot currently in traversal or detect 464 * state the counter for that VF ID does not increment on top of existing 465 * values in the mailbox overflow detection algorithm. 466 */ 467 snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr[vf_id] = 0; 468 469 return 0; 470} 471 472/** 473 * ice_mbx_init_snapshot - Initialize mailbox snapshot structure 474 * @hw: pointer to the hardware structure 475 * @vf_count: number of VFs allocated on a PF 476 * 477 * Clear the mailbox snapshot structure and allocate memory 478 * for the VF counter array based on the number of VFs allocated 479 * on that PF. 480 * 481 * Assumption: This function will assume ice_get_caps() has already been 482 * called to ensure that the vf_count can be compared against the number 483 * of VFs supported as defined in the functional capabilities of the device. 484 */ 485enum ice_status ice_mbx_init_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_count) 486{ 487 struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot; 488 489 /* Ensure that the number of VFs allocated is non-zero and 490 * is not greater than the number of supported VFs defined in 491 * the functional capabilities of the PF. 492 */ 493 if (!vf_count || vf_count > hw->func_caps.num_allocd_vfs) 494 return ICE_ERR_INVAL_SIZE; 495 496 snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr = devm_kcalloc(ice_hw_to_dev(hw), vf_count, 497 sizeof(*snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr), 498 GFP_KERNEL); 499 if (!snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr) 500 return ICE_ERR_NO_MEMORY; 501 502 /* Setting the VF counter length to the number of allocated 503 * VFs for given PF's functional capabilities. 504 */ 505 snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len = vf_count; 506 507 /* Clear mbx_buf in the mailbox snaphot structure and setting the 508 * mailbox snapshot state to a new capture. 509 */ 510 memset(&snap->mbx_buf, 0, sizeof(snap->mbx_buf)); 511 snap->mbx_buf.state = ICE_MAL_VF_DETECT_STATE_NEW_SNAPSHOT; 512 513 return 0; 514} 515 516/** 517 * ice_mbx_deinit_snapshot - Free mailbox snapshot structure 518 * @hw: pointer to the hardware structure 519 * 520 * Clear the mailbox snapshot structure and free the VF counter array. 521 */ 522void ice_mbx_deinit_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw) 523{ 524 struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap = &hw->mbx_snapshot; 525 526 /* Free VF counter array and reset VF counter length */ 527 devm_kfree(ice_hw_to_dev(hw), snap->mbx_vf.vf_cntr); 528 snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len = 0; 529 530 /* Clear mbx_buf in the mailbox snaphot structure */ 531 memset(&snap->mbx_buf, 0, sizeof(snap->mbx_buf)); 532} 533