// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
 * fs/crypto/hooks.c
 *
 * Encryption hooks for higher-level filesystem operations.
 */

#include <linux/key.h>

#include "fscrypt_private.h"

/**
 * fscrypt_file_open() - prepare to open a possibly-encrypted regular file
 * @inode: the inode being opened
 * @filp: the struct file being set up
 *
 * Currently, an encrypted regular file can only be opened if its encryption key
 * is available; access to the raw encrypted contents is not supported.
 * Therefore, we first set up the inode's encryption key (if not already done)
 * and return an error if it's unavailable.
 *
 * We also verify that if the parent directory (from the path via which the file
 * is being opened) is encrypted, then the inode being opened uses the same
 * encryption policy.  This is needed as part of the enforcement that all files
 * in an encrypted directory tree use the same encryption policy, as a
 * protection against certain types of offline attacks.  Note that this check is
 * needed even when opening an *unencrypted* file, since it's forbidden to have
 * an unencrypted file in an encrypted directory.
 *
 * Return: 0 on success, -ENOKEY if the key is missing, or another -errno code
 */
int fscrypt_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
        int err;
        struct dentry *dir;

        err = fscrypt_require_key(inode);
        if (err)
                return err;

        dir = dget_parent(file_dentry(filp));
        if (IS_ENCRYPTED(d_inode(dir)) &&
            !fscrypt_has_permitted_context(d_inode(dir), inode)) {
                fscrypt_warn(inode,
                             "Inconsistent encryption context (parent directory: %lu)",
                             d_inode(dir)->i_ino);
                err = -EPERM;
        }
        dput(dir);
        return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_file_open);

int __fscrypt_prepare_link(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
                           struct dentry *dentry)
{
        if (fscrypt_is_nokey_name(dentry))
                return -ENOKEY;
        /*
         * We don't need to separately check that the directory inode's key is
         * available, as it's implied by the dentry not being a no-key name.
         */

        if (!fscrypt_has_permitted_context(dir, inode))
                return -EXDEV;

        return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_link);

int __fscrypt_prepare_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
                             struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
                             unsigned int flags)
{
        if (fscrypt_is_nokey_name(old_dentry) ||
            fscrypt_is_nokey_name(new_dentry))
                return -ENOKEY;
        /*
         * We don't need to separately check that the directory inodes' keys are
         * available, as it's implied by the dentries not being no-key names.
         */

        if (old_dir != new_dir) {
                if (IS_ENCRYPTED(new_dir) &&
                    !fscrypt_has_permitted_context(new_dir,
                                                   d_inode(old_dentry)))
                        return -EXDEV;

                if ((flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) &&
                    IS_ENCRYPTED(old_dir) &&
                    !fscrypt_has_permitted_context(old_dir,
                                                   d_inode(new_dentry)))
                        return -EXDEV;
        }
        return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_rename);

int __fscrypt_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
                             struct fscrypt_name *fname)
{
        int err = fscrypt_setup_filename(dir, &dentry->d_name, 1, fname);

        if (err && err != -ENOENT)
                return err;

        if (fname->is_nokey_name) {
                spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
                dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME;
                spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
        }
        return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_lookup);

int __fscrypt_prepare_readdir(struct inode *dir)
{
        return fscrypt_get_encryption_info(dir, true);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_readdir);

int __fscrypt_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
{
        if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)
                return fscrypt_require_key(d_inode(dentry));
        return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_setattr);

/**
 * fscrypt_prepare_setflags() - prepare to change flags with FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
 * @inode: the inode on which flags are being changed
 * @oldflags: the old flags
 * @flags: the new flags
 *
 * The caller should be holding i_rwsem for write.
 *
 * Return: 0 on success; -errno if the flags change isn't allowed or if
 *         another error occurs.
 */
int fscrypt_prepare_setflags(struct inode *inode,
                             unsigned int oldflags, unsigned int flags)
{
        struct fscrypt_info *ci;
        struct key *key;
        struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
        int err;

        /*
         * When the CASEFOLD flag is set on an encrypted directory, we must
         * derive the secret key needed for the dirhash.  This is only possible
         * if the directory uses a v2 encryption policy.
         */
        if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && (flags & ~oldflags & FS_CASEFOLD_FL)) {
                err = fscrypt_require_key(inode);
                if (err)
                        return err;
                ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
                if (ci->ci_policy.version != FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2)
                        return -EINVAL;
                key = ci->ci_master_key;
                mk = key->payload.data[0];
                down_read(&key->sem);
                if (is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret))
                        err = fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(ci, mk);
                else
                        err = -ENOKEY;
                up_read(&key->sem);
                return err;
        }
        return 0;
}

/**
 * fscrypt_prepare_symlink() - prepare to create a possibly-encrypted symlink
 * @dir: directory in which the symlink is being created
 * @target: plaintext symlink target
 * @len: length of @target excluding null terminator
 * @max_len: space the filesystem has available to store the symlink target
 * @disk_link: (out) the on-disk symlink target being prepared
 *
 * This function computes the size the symlink target will require on-disk,
 * stores it in @disk_link->len, and validates it against @max_len.  An
 * encrypted symlink may be longer than the original.
 *
 * Additionally, @disk_link->name is set to @target if the symlink will be
 * unencrypted, but left NULL if the symlink will be encrypted.  For encrypted
 * symlinks, the filesystem must call fscrypt_encrypt_symlink() to create the
 * on-disk target later.  (The reason for the two-step process is that some
 * filesystems need to know the size of the symlink target before creating the
 * inode, e.g. to determine whether it will be a "fast" or "slow" symlink.)
 *
 * Return: 0 on success, -ENAMETOOLONG if the symlink target is too long,
 * -ENOKEY if the encryption key is missing, or another -errno code if a problem
 * occurred while setting up the encryption key.
 */
int fscrypt_prepare_symlink(struct inode *dir, const char *target,
                            unsigned int len, unsigned int max_len,
                            struct fscrypt_str *disk_link)
{
        const union fscrypt_policy *policy;

        /*
         * To calculate the size of the encrypted symlink target we need to know
         * the amount of NUL padding, which is determined by the flags set in
         * the encryption policy which will be inherited from the directory.
         */
        policy = fscrypt_policy_to_inherit(dir);
        if (policy == NULL) {
                /* Not encrypted */
                disk_link->name = (unsigned char *)target;
                disk_link->len = len + 1;
                if (disk_link->len > max_len)
                        return -ENAMETOOLONG;
                return 0;
        }
        if (IS_ERR(policy))
                return PTR_ERR(policy);

        /*
         * Calculate the size of the encrypted symlink and verify it won't
         * exceed max_len.  Note that for historical reasons, encrypted symlink
         * targets are prefixed with the ciphertext length, despite this
         * actually being redundant with i_size.  This decreases by 2 bytes the
         * longest symlink target we can accept.
         *
         * We could recover 1 byte by not counting a null terminator, but
         * counting it (even though it is meaningless for ciphertext) is simpler
         * for now since filesystems will assume it is there and subtract it.
         */
        if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(policy, len,
                                          max_len - sizeof(struct fscrypt_symlink_data),
                                          &disk_link->len))
                return -ENAMETOOLONG;
        disk_link->len += sizeof(struct fscrypt_symlink_data);

        disk_link->name = NULL;
        return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_prepare_symlink);

int __fscrypt_encrypt_symlink(struct inode *inode, const char *target,
                              unsigned int len, struct fscrypt_str *disk_link)
{
        int err;
        struct qstr iname = QSTR_INIT(target, len);
        struct fscrypt_symlink_data *sd;
        unsigned int ciphertext_len;

        /*
         * fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() should have already set up the new
         * symlink inode's encryption key.  We don't wait until now to do it,
         * since we may be in a filesystem transaction now.
         */
        if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(inode)))
                return -ENOKEY;

        if (disk_link->name) {
                /* filesystem-provided buffer */
                sd = (struct fscrypt_symlink_data *)disk_link->name;
        } else {
                sd = kmalloc(disk_link->len, GFP_NOFS);
                if (!sd)
                        return -ENOMEM;
        }
        ciphertext_len = disk_link->len - sizeof(*sd);
        sd->len = cpu_to_le16(ciphertext_len);

        err = fscrypt_fname_encrypt(inode, &iname, sd->encrypted_path,
                                    ciphertext_len);
        if (err)
                goto err_free_sd;

        /*
         * Null-terminating the ciphertext doesn't make sense, but we still
         * count the null terminator in the length, so we might as well
         * initialize it just in case the filesystem writes it out.
         */
        sd->encrypted_path[ciphertext_len] = '\0';

        /* Cache the plaintext symlink target for later use by get_link() */
        err = -ENOMEM;
        inode->i_link = kmemdup(target, len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
        if (!inode->i_link)
                goto err_free_sd;

        if (!disk_link->name)
                disk_link->name = (unsigned char *)sd;
        return 0;

err_free_sd:
        if (!disk_link->name)
                kfree(sd);
        return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_encrypt_symlink);

/**
 * fscrypt_get_symlink() - get the target of an encrypted symlink
 * @inode: the symlink inode
 * @caddr: the on-disk contents of the symlink
 * @max_size: size of @caddr buffer
 * @done: if successful, will be set up to free the returned target if needed
 *
 * If the symlink's encryption key is available, we decrypt its target.
 * Otherwise, we encode its target for presentation.
 *
 * This may sleep, so the filesystem must have dropped out of RCU mode already.
 *
 * Return: the presentable symlink target or an ERR_PTR()
 */
const char *fscrypt_get_symlink(struct inode *inode, const void *caddr,
                                unsigned int max_size,
                                struct delayed_call *done)
{
        const struct fscrypt_symlink_data *sd;
        struct fscrypt_str cstr, pstr;
        bool has_key;
        int err;

        /* This is for encrypted symlinks only */
        if (WARN_ON(!IS_ENCRYPTED(inode)))
                return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);

        /* If the decrypted target is already cached, just return it. */
        pstr.name = READ_ONCE(inode->i_link);
        if (pstr.name)
                return pstr.name;

        /*
         * Try to set up the symlink's encryption key, but we can continue
         * regardless of whether the key is available or not.
         */
        err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(inode, false);
        if (err)
                return ERR_PTR(err);
        has_key = fscrypt_has_encryption_key(inode);

        /*
         * For historical reasons, encrypted symlink targets are prefixed with
         * the ciphertext length, even though this is redundant with i_size.
         */

        if (max_size < sizeof(*sd))
                return ERR_PTR(-EUCLEAN);
        sd = caddr;
        cstr.name = (unsigned char *)sd->encrypted_path;
        cstr.len = le16_to_cpu(sd->len);

        if (cstr.len == 0)
                return ERR_PTR(-EUCLEAN);

        if (cstr.len + sizeof(*sd) - 1 > max_size)
                return ERR_PTR(-EUCLEAN);

        err = fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(cstr.len, &pstr);
        if (err)
                return ERR_PTR(err);

        err = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(inode, 0, 0, &cstr, &pstr);
        if (err)
                goto err_kfree;

        err = -EUCLEAN;
        if (pstr.name[0] == '\0')
                goto err_kfree;

        pstr.name[pstr.len] = '\0';

        /*
         * Cache decrypted symlink targets in i_link for later use.  Don't cache
         * symlink targets encoded without the key, since those become outdated
         * once the key is added.  This pairs with the READ_ONCE() above and in
         * the VFS path lookup code.
         */
        if (!has_key ||
            cmpxchg_release(&inode->i_link, NULL, pstr.name) != NULL)
                set_delayed_call(done, kfree_link, pstr.name);

        return pstr.name;

err_kfree:
        kfree(pstr.name);
        return ERR_PTR(err);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_get_symlink);

/**
 * fscrypt_symlink_getattr() - set the correct st_size for encrypted symlinks
 * @path: the path for the encrypted symlink being queried
 * @stat: the struct being filled with the symlink's attributes
 *
 * Override st_size of encrypted symlinks to be the length of the decrypted
 * symlink target (or the no-key encoded symlink target, if the key is
 * unavailable) rather than the length of the encrypted symlink target.  This is
 * necessary for st_size to match the symlink target that userspace actually
 * sees.  POSIX requires this, and some userspace programs depend on it.
 *
 * This requires reading the symlink target from disk if needed, setting up the
 * inode's encryption key if possible, and then decrypting or encoding the
 * symlink target.  This makes lstat() more heavyweight than is normally the
 * case.  However, decrypted symlink targets will be cached in ->i_link, so
 * usually the symlink won't have to be read and decrypted again later if/when
 * it is actually followed, readlink() is called, or lstat() is called again.
 *
 * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
 */
int fscrypt_symlink_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat)
{
        struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
        struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
        const char *link;
        DEFINE_DELAYED_CALL(done);

        /*
         * To get the symlink target that userspace will see (whether it's the
         * decrypted target or the no-key encoded target), we can just get it in
         * the same way the VFS does during path resolution and readlink().
         */
        link = READ_ONCE(inode->i_link);
        if (!link) {
                link = inode->i_op->get_link(dentry, inode, &done);
                if (IS_ERR(link))
                        return PTR_ERR(link);
        }
        stat->size = strlen(link);
        do_delayed_call(&done);
        return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_symlink_getattr);