qemu/docs/system/s390x/protvirt.rst
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   1Protected Virtualization on s390x
   2=================================
   3
   4The memory and most of the registers of Protected Virtual Machines
   5(PVMs) are encrypted or inaccessible to the hypervisor, effectively
   6prohibiting VM introspection when the VM is running. At rest, PVMs are
   7encrypted and can only be decrypted by the firmware, represented by an
   8entity called Ultravisor, of specific IBM Z machines.
   9
  10
  11Prerequisites
  12-------------
  13
  14To run PVMs, a machine with the Protected Virtualization feature, as
  15indicated by the Ultravisor Call facility (stfle bit 158), is
  16required. The Ultravisor needs to be initialized at boot by setting
  17``prot_virt=1`` on the host's kernel command line.
  18
  19Running PVMs requires using the KVM hypervisor.
  20
  21If those requirements are met, the capability ``KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED``
  22will indicate that KVM can support PVMs on that LPAR.
  23
  24
  25Running a Protected Virtual Machine
  26-----------------------------------
  27
  28To run a PVM you will need to select a CPU model which includes the
  29``Unpack facility`` (stfle bit 161 represented by the feature
  30``unpack``/``S390_FEAT_UNPACK``), and add these options to the command line::
  31
  32    -object s390-pv-guest,id=pv0 \
  33    -machine confidential-guest-support=pv0
  34
  35Adding these options will:
  36
  37* Ensure the ``unpack`` facility is available
  38* Enable the IOMMU by default for all I/O devices
  39* Initialize the PV mechanism
  40
  41Passthrough (vfio) devices are currently not supported.
  42
  43Host huge page backings are not supported. However guests can use huge
  44pages as indicated by its facilities.
  45
  46
  47Boot Process
  48------------
  49
  50A secure guest image can either be loaded from disk or supplied on the
  51QEMU command line. Booting from disk is done by the unmodified
  52s390-ccw BIOS. I.e., the bootmap is interpreted, multiple components
  53are read into memory and control is transferred to one of the
  54components (zipl stage3). Stage3 does some fixups and then transfers
  55control to some program residing in guest memory, which is normally
  56the OS kernel. The secure image has another component prepended
  57(stage3a) that uses the new diag308 subcodes 8 and 10 to trigger the
  58transition into secure mode.
  59
  60Booting from the image supplied on the QEMU command line requires that
  61the file passed via -kernel has the same memory layout as would result
  62from the disk boot. This memory layout includes the encrypted
  63components (kernel, initrd, cmdline), the stage3a loader and
  64metadata. In case this boot method is used, the command line
  65options -initrd and -cmdline are ineffective. The preparation of a PVM
  66image is done via the ``genprotimg`` tool from the s390-tools
  67collection.
  68